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I.
I.

ABSTRACT

Lands subject to state claims of ownership did exist prior to
to 1938 in what is now known as the Back Bay National Wildlife
Refuge. The origins of state claims are varied:
A. A strip of state land known as a commons ran along the entire_
length of the Refuge beach extending 907 feet above the high water
mark and was entered into public record in the late 1860's. There
is no record of this land ever being lawfully conveyed. Deeds
and other records making references to public lands or commons in
this area date back to 1621.
B. A grant along the seashore appears to have been made after the
passage of state legislation precluding the grant of the shores
of the sea after 1873.
(Approximately one-fourth of the Refuge
beachfront was conveyed after 1873.)
C. Large areas of the Refuge were ungranted state lands at
the time of the condemnation. The northern three-fourths of the
Refuge beach and most of the inland portion of the barrier beach
associated with it appear to fall within this category and comprise
more than 1,046 acres.
D.

A small marsh island of eight acres was conveyed after

the passage 0£ an 1888 statute prohibiting the grantinq of marshes

on the eastern shore of Virginia (Emphasis added. The Act as
originally enacted did not capitalize the words ea~tern shore.
Code revisors first capitalized the words in 1948.)
II.

Although Federal Condemnation operates in rem and would as a
general rule vest valid title in the federal government,
A.

Proper notice to potential claimants is required; and

B. Under the federal Migratory Bird Conservation Act state
consent is required.
III.

IV.

V.
VI.

Based on analysis of the federal Migratory Bird Conservation
Act of 1929 and state statutes, Virginia consented to the condemnation of private and corporate lands but not state lands.
Research indicates that the federal government's title search
produced evidence of potential state claims within the Refuge requiring the state be given notice as an adversary party in the
condemnation proceedings.
Virginia was not given required notice.
A. The federal government in the condemnation suit in 1938 either
deliberately or through a higher order of negligence masked a state
claim to 1,046 acres of what appears to be ungranted state land
at the time of the condemnation by taking much smaller privately
owned tracts located elsewhere in the area and depicting them as
occupying the 1,046 acre area subject to state claim.
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B. Other lands were subject to state claim by virtue of being
(1) state owned commons or by being (2) seashores protected from
grant by the Virginia statute of 1873 or by being (3) marshes
possibly protected from grant by the Virginia statute of 1888.

VII.

The state may argue that:
A. The state granted consent only to the taking of private and
corporate lands under the state consent statutes of 1930, 1936
and 1938 thereby rendering the condemnation invalid as to
state land and/or
B.
Regardless of consent the title examination records of the
federal government disclose potential state claims triggering
a due process requirement to notify the state of such claims
in the condemnation proceedings. (!)Negligent omission of this
duty would lead to a just compensation award to the state.
(2)
Fraudulent omission of this duty would at least lead to the
condemnation being invalid as to state lands.

VIII.

IX.

Other potential arguments have been assessed and found lacking:
A.

Prescriptive Easement,

B.

Implied Dedication,

C.

Public Trust,

D.

Custom.

Potential defenses either present no barrier to state claims or
can be countered by reasonable arguments.

5

II.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The research on which this report is based has largely been
the product of a team of law and science students employed as
Interns in the Environmental Law and Marine Affairs Program operated
under the auspices of the School of Law and the School of Marine
Science at the College of William and Mary.

Many of the researchers

came to this project after having been previously involved in
related research.

The following individuals devoted either partial

or full effort to this project over a three and one-half month
period:
Professor N. Bartlett Theberge, B.S., J.D., LL.M., member
of the Faculties of the Schools of Law and Marine Science
at the College of William and Mary; Coordinator, Environmental
Law and Marine Affairs Internship Program.
Susan W. Carter, Research Specialist, School of Marine Science,
College of William and Mary.
Michael J. Casey, Law Intern.
Glenn R. DeLaney, Marine Science Intern.
James A. Lofton, Law Intern.
Kurt Pomrenke, Law Intern.
Michael A. Robusto, Law Intern.
Robert E. Croonenberghs, Marine Science Intern.
E. Roy Hawkens, Law Intern.
Micheal L. Hern, Law Intern.
Andrew W. Zacherle, Marine Science Intern.
Special debts of appreciation are owed to the following
individuals:

6

Senator Joseph T. Fitzpatrick, the Chairman of the Senate
Subcommittee on False Cape, for aiding us in securing documents
and for generally facilitating the research; the Clerk of the Cour~
of Virginia Beach, J. Curtis Fruit and his staff for aiding us in our
research; the staff of the State Archives Division of the State
Library for their aid; Dave Carlson, Office of the Governor, for
hi~ aid; Bruce B. Meador, Programs Supervisor of the Department
of Conservation and Economic Development, for handling the financial
aspects of the project; Donald Budlong of the Office of the Secretary
of Conunerce and Resources for his insights; Paul V. Koehly,
Internal Auditor of the College of William and Mary for guiding the
project through the bureaucratic shoals; Roger Chaffe of the Attorney
General's Office and John Daniel of the Division of Legislative
Services for their advice at various stages of the project;
Katherine Tyler, former owner of Virginia Title a1~ Mortgage
Corporation for her information regarding the condemnation; Marvin
Bowling of Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation for his efforts to
locate title information within company records; the Personnel
of the Department of Interior's Real Estate Division for their support;
and finally, the Art Department of the School of Marine Science for
not only the quality but also for the speed in which they prepared our
artwork.

7

III.

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1970's the Department of Ocean and Coastal
Law at the Virginia Institute of Marine Science, the School of
Marine Science of the College of William and Mary has been
carrying out research into the nature of private and public
rights and ownership of riparian, subaqueous and coastal lands;
Smolen, Theodore F.

"Historical Overview of Lands Known as

Common", Virginia Institute of Marine Science, 1974; Theberge, N.
B., 1975.

"An Investigation into the History and Ownership of

Starling's Island", Virginia Institute of Marine Science,prepared
pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution No. 153; Theberge, N. B., 1976.
"An Investigation into the History and Ownership of Adam's Island",
Virginia Institute of Marine Science, prepared pursuant to Senate
Joint Resolution No. 57.

Evidence, information, and theories

resulting from departmental research have found its way into
litigation and legislation.

Coupland v. Morton, 7 ERC 1965 (1975);

Commonwealth of Virginia v. The Nature Conservancy and Bradford,
Record No. 79-1320; Public Beach Conservation and Development Act,
Va. Code Ann. § 10-215 et seq.

(1978 Repl. Vol.).

On the basis of

our past association with questions pertaining to governmental,
private and public rights in coastal lands, we were requested to
examine state law, federal law, and the history of state, private and
federal ownership in the area of the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge
(Appendix 1,

Figure 1) in order to determine what rights of public

access might exist in this area.
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IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

COMMONS CONCEPTS

Although commons concepts developed independently in many
cultures, the origins of the commons concepts embodied in Virginia· law
can be traced to England.

In cultures of Germanic peoples such as the

Angles and the Saxons who inhabited England, common property and
common rights were well known.

The Roman conquerors of these

peoples also accepted the concepts of common property and common
rights.

Under Roman civil law at the time of Emperor Justinian,

438 - 565 A.D., no one was forbidden access to the seashore.

An

interesting parallel existed between early Roman civil law of the
fifth and sixth centuries and pronouncements made by the Privy
Council and the House of Commons regarding the rights to the shores
of the sea in the new colony of Virginia in the seventeenth century
(1621).

In Justinian's time, public use of the seashore was

recognized as a part of the "law of nations" and certain rights such
as hauling nets and drying them

rights that could only be exercised

on lands above the ebb and flow of the tide -- were codified.
Seventeenth century English statements are strikingly similar to

the Roman espression of rights above the ebb and flow of the tide
existing in Justinian's time.

The pronouncements of the Privy

Council and Parliament referred to public rights in the shores of
the sea to haul nets, boats, collect wood, build fires and carry
out other activities associated with fishing.
The Norman conquest of England in 1066 A.D., introduced
significant changes in concepts of property ownership.
9

Under

the Normans the sovereign owned all land and lesser individuals
held land only with the sovereign's acquiescence.

It is unclear

how Germanic tribal customs, Roman civil law and Norman concepts
may have affected the evolution of commons.

The signing of the

Magna Carta, however, in 1215 gave some indication that the rights
to the shores were a source of conflict less than 150 years after
the Norman conquest.

Prior to the Magna Carta, English Kings

had exercised the rights to grant exclusive fisheries in tidal
areas.

The Magna Carta assured greater recognition of public rights

in such areas.

J. Angell, The Rights of Property in Tide Water and

in the Soil and Shores Thereof, pp. 23-25,

(2d. ed., 1847).

Inherent to the commons concept, is the problem of private
usurpation of such lands or rights.

This has been a problem of

long standing in Great Britain and only recently was a Royal
Commission appointed to deal with the loss of common lands and
common rights.

Virginia shares not only the legal inheritance of

the commons concepts but also the problems attendant to those
concepts.
Commons in Virginia are state owned lands subject to certain
common rights.

(They may also be private lands over which are imposed

certain common rights

Appendix 2.)

State owned lands which were

specifically declared to be common may exist within the Back Bay
National Wildlife Refuge.

Evidence of commons can be found early

in the Colonial period (Appendix 3).

In April of 1621

the House of Commons in England passed an "Act for the Freer
Liberty of Fishing"

addressing conflicts

over fishing

rights off the coasts of Newfoundland, New England and Virginia.
10

This act sets forth the rights of "his majesties subjects" to
freely use the sea shore of the aforementioned places for the
purposes of taking, drying, salting and otherwise processing fish,
gathering of wood for fuel and repairs, and for the purposes of
performing any other activities necessary for the maintenance of
their fishery operations.
In June of 1621 the Privy Council of England issued a similar
statement regarding freedom of fishing.

In this document the Council

ordered that "the people of the Colonies . . • should have freedom
of the shore for drying of their nets, and taking and saving of
their fish and to have wood for their necessary uses . . . . "
These documents establish at an early date that the shore lands in
the Colonies of Newfoundland, New England and Virginia were to be
used as a corrunon.
About 1770 a petition was filed with the President of the
Colony of Virginia requesting that certain lands along the Atlantic
Beaches of Princess Anne County be withheld from grant as these
lands comprised a corrunons.

The petition stated" . . . for many

years past a Corrunon Fishery hath been carried on by many of the
Inhabitants of said county and others on the Shore of the Ocean
and Bay aforesaid . . . . "
p. 50,

(1957).

J. Wharton, The Bounty of The Chesapeake,

Apparently in response to such concerns the new

government drafted an act in 1780 which protectE~d from any future
grants those "unappropriated lands on the bay, sea and river shores,
in the eastern parts of this commonwealth [which] have been
heretofore reserved as a corrunon to all the citizens thereof.
10 Bening 226.

(Appendix

4).
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The lands along the Atlantic

II

shoreline in Princess Anne County were apparently protected from
grant by the 1780 act.
In 1867, J.P. Hale applied for grants to four tracts of land
comprising the barrier beach in Princess Anne County.

These tracts

totaled over 9,000 acres extending from the North Carolina line
to Cape Henry including the area which is now the entire Atlantic
shore of the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge.

When the

application for these lands was received, the County Clerk noted
the common nature of the shore lands in this area.

The Clerk

stated in one document that any grant for the land requested
was to exclude "all fishing shores and privileges which were

reserved as a common to all the people of the state by the Act
of 1780 • . . . "

Surveyor's Book, Princess Anne County, 1850-1904.

In another document that referred specifically to the shore land
now comprised within the limits of the Back Bay National Wildlife
Refuge the Clerk states that any grant "is not intended to include
the fishing shores which are reserved as a common to all of the
people of the state . . . . "

1850-1904.

Surveyor's Book, Princess Anne County,

As a result, the accompanying surveys demonstrate

in graphic detail what was considered to be the common shore lands
in l869.

The shoreline strip of common land is shown to extend

13 chains, 75 links, or 907 feet landward of "ordinary high water
mark".

This strip runs parallel to the high water mark and

includes what is now the Atlantic shoreline of the Back Bay
National Wildlife Refuge.

(Appendix
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1, Figure 2).

Hale's application for a grant to these lands was never
finalized.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the Atlantic shore lands

within the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge were a common of long
standing and that the 1780 Act was indeed utilized to protect these
lands from grant.

After the War Between the States, the Act of 1780

was repealed by legislation enacted in 1866.

By virtue of that

legislation common lands and any other state land could be legally
conveyed until this legislation was repealed in 1873.

However, none

of the common lands within the refuge were ever granted during this
period.
In April of 1873, the General Assembly passed an act which states
that "all the beds of the bays, rivers and creE~ks, and the shores
of the sea within this Commonwealth and not conveyed by special
grant or compact according to law, shall continue and remain the
property.of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and may be used as a
common by all the people of the state for the purposes of fishing
and fowling and taking and catching of oysters and other shellfish."
(Appendix 5).

This statute exists at Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-1 (1973

Repl. Vol. ) •
At least as late as 1887 a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
review of the fisheries of the United States indicated that the
Atlantic shores of Princess Anne County were still maintained as
a fishery.
In 1888, the General Assembly passed an act to prevent the
granting of unappropriated marsh or meadow lands on the eastern
shore of Virginia.

Apparently this Act was necessary to further
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clarify the language found in the 1873 Act as it states that:
"all unappropriated marsh or meadow lands lying on the eastern
shore of Virginia, which have remained ungranted, and which have
been used as a common by the people of this state, shall continue
as such common, shall remain ungranted, and no land warrant shall
be located upon the same.

That any of the people of this state

may fish, fowl, or hunt on any such marsh or meadow lands."
(Appendix

6).

The text of the 1888 act presently exists in

the Va. Code Ann. § 41.1-4 (1981 Repl. Vol.).

However, contrary

to the original legislation, the present Code contains the phrase
"eastern shore" in a capitalized form.

This change was the result

of work done by Code revisors in 1948 and not by legislative

action.

Therefore, the 1888 legislation may apply to all marshes

on the eastern seaboard of Virginia rather than only to those in
Accomack and Northampton Counties.
The commons doctrine occupies an important position with
respect to the title to the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge.
By virtue of the operation of statutes and the common law, the
State of Virginia may have been the owner of land in Back Bay at
the time of the 1938 condemnation.

The significance of this

doctrine will be more apparent in the title analysis which follows.
B.

TITLE

1.

Princess Anne Club Tract

a)

Colonial Grants and Early Conveyances, 1647-1858:

The Princess Anne Club Tract as condemned by the United States
in 1938 totaled 3,113.52 acres of land.
of three land areas:

The club tract was comprised

Long Island, Little Island and the seaboard
14

tract.

These lands were originally granted to individuals during

the late 17th and early 18th centuries.
(i)

Long Island

Long Island is situated in Back Bay.

It contains 1,167 acres

and is comprised of high lands, marsh lands and islands.

It is

bordered on the north by Shipp's Bay; on the west by the Great
Narrows and Red Head Bay; on the south by Little Narrows; and on
the east by the waters of Buck Island Bay which separates Long
Island from the seaboard tract.
The Long Island tract was in continuous private ownership from
colonial grants to the time of the condemnation in 1938.

There are

acreage discrepancies from conveyance to conveyance and numerous
chains of title end.

Differences in the total acreage estimates

of Long Island vary from 1,381 acres (colonial land grants), to
1,545 acres (acquisitions by Edgar Burroughs), and finally to
1,167 acres (1938 federal condemnation).

This can only be explained

by assuming that prior to the condemnation in 1938, surveys of
Long Island inaccurately estimated acreage totals.

An examination

of the land descriptions in the grants and deeds to Long Island
prior to 1938 leave no doubt that they are the same lands
described in the condemnation proceedings.
The entirety of Long Island by 1858 was owned by Edgar
Burroughs, a County Conunissioner for Princess Anne County.
(ii)

Little Island

Located in Back Bay, Little Island contains 200 acres of land
and marshes situated between Long Island and the Atlantic Ocean.
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Although once an island, it is now physically a part of the
seaboard tract.

Because its title devolves along a separate and

distinct chain of title from that of the remainder of the seaboard
tract, Little Island is abstracted separately.

Both Little

Island and the seaboard tract have the same beginning in ownership
under Edward Lamount around the year 1700.

An unbroken chain of

title exists for the 200 acres of Little Island beginning with
Edward Lamount's conveyance to Lewis Conner (1,775 acres of the
seaboard tract in 1708) through the possession by Edgar Burroughs
in 1853.
Today, this tract no longer carries the name of Little Island.
Rather, reference to Little Island is found north of the Back Bay
National Wildlife Refuge on the seaboard side and pertains to the
Little Island

Life Saving Station.

No information exists in the

title abstract that related the Life Saving Station to the 200 acres
of island marsh owned by Edgar Burroughs in 1853.
(iii)

The Seaboard Tract

The seaboard tract is that strip of land bordered on the east
by the Atlantic Ocean on the west by the waters of Buck Island Bay
and Back Bay.

Ownership of this tract began in the late 17th

century through colonial grants issued by the Governor of Virginia.
These grants are referenced in the 1708 Edward Lamount to Lewis
Conner deed of 1,775 acres of the seaboard tract.

The Lamount/

Conner deed describes the southern boundary of the tract as
bordering on the land patented by John Fulcher from the Governor
of Virginia.

The Fulcher border is slightly northeast of the
16

northern tip of Ragged Island; therefore, the adjacent Lamount/
Conner tract contains the entire seaboard tract of the Wildlife
Refuge.
Title to this 1,775 acres of land was quickly divided among
many individuals.
inexplicably ended.

By 1800, however, most of the chains of title
Except for the Little Island tract of 200

acres which can be traced back to Edward Lamount, there is no
other land in the seaboard tract from the Lamount/Conner deed which
can be traced to Edgar Burroughs, or any other individual in the
1850's.
The discontinuity in title to the seaboard tract has been
verified by the records of the 1938 condemnation.

Among these

records is the title abstract compiled in 1938 by James Mills
of the Virginia Title and Mortgage Corporation.

This abstract

contains no record of title to the seaboard tract after the very
early 1800's.
Any attempt to explain why the chains of tit.le to the seaboard
tract disappeared is largely supposition.

One plausible theory

involves a Virginia Act of Assembly passed in Ma.y of 1779 entitled
An act concerning escheats and forfeitures from British subjects.
10 Hening's Statutes at Large 66, 1779-1881.

This act provided

that all property, real and personal, which belonged to any
British subject at the time of its enactment would be vested in
the Commonwealth by way of escheat.

There is evidence that at

least one of th~ landowners of the seaboard tract was a British
subject from Liverpool, England.

In light of the low dollar value

of the lands in Back Bay and the anti-British sentiment at that time,
many landowners may simply have abandoned their land.
17

From the landmar:.: case of Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee,
11 U.S.

(7 Cranch) 603 (1813), it is apparent that this Act

was used often and validly between its enactment in 1779 and the
signing of the Jay Trecty in 1794.

The Jay Treaty confirmed the

titles of British subjects owning land in Virginia at the time of
its signing.

The full e}fect of the treaty on the Virginia

statute was not immediately apparent, however, as evidenced by the
need for the Fairfax rulir~ in 1813.
Regardless of why the title ended, there is no doubt that the
State of Virginia acquired ownership by virtue of an automatic
forfeiture of the lands for non-payment of taxes.

The earliest

Virginia statute on the subjE:·ct appears to be a 1790 Act which
declared lands to be forfeited absolutely for non-payment of taxes.
This Act, passed on December 27, 1790 (Sess. Acts of 179'0, Ch .. 5

§

1)

§ 1) declared if the tax on any tract of land should not be paid
for the space of three years, the right of such lands should be
forfeited and title vested in the Commonwealth.
Although the procedures of forfeiture underwent some slight
modifications, the basic statute remained in effect until repealed
by an Act of February 9, 1814 (2 Rev. Code 1819, p. 555).

The Act

repealed all forfeiture statutes and made it possible for land
previously forfeited to be reclaimed.

No forfeiture could have

occurred until the passage of the Act in 1835.
52 Va.

(11 Gratt.) 572 (1854).

Levasser v. Washburn,

The 1835 Act was interpreted by the

court in Levasser:

18

The act . . . declaring that lands which had
been omitted from the books of the commissioners
of the revenue should be forfeited unless the
owners should cause the same to be entered and
charged with taxes, and should pay the same except
such as might be released by law, was intended by its
own force and energy to render the forfeiture
absolute and complete, without the necessity of any
inquisition, judicial proceeding or finding of any kind
in order to consununate it. It was perfectly within the
competence of the legislature to declare such forfeiture
and divest the title by the mere operation of the act
itself, and the whole legislation upon the subject of
delinquent and forfeited lands plainly manifests the
intention to exercise its power in this form.
Id. at 581.
An Act in March 1836 (Session Acts, p. 7) provided additional
time, until November 1, 1836, to comply with the provisions of the
February 27, 1835 Act.

This was the time requirement for owners

of omitted lands to enter those lands on the books.

If the owners

failed to comply, the forfeiture became absolute from and after
November 1, 1836.
The Virginia courts construed these statutes as making the
forfeiture complete as of November 1, 1836, and as requiring no
judicial proceedings of any kind to consummate such forfeiture.
Lennig v. White, 1 Va. 873, 20 S.E. 831 (1894); Wild's Lessee v.
Serpell, 51 Va.

(10 Gratt.)

405 (1853); Staats v. Board, 51 Va.

(10 Gratt.) 400 (1853); Usher's v. Pride, 56 Va.
(1858).

(15 Gratt.) 190

As late as 1898 the Virginia Supreme Court in a case

involving omitted lands reaffirmed that:
the forfeiture becomes absolute and complete by the
failure to enter the lands upon the books of the
commissioner of the revenue, and to pay the taxes, etc.
in the manner prescribed by the Act of February 27,
1835, and that no judgment or decree, inquest of office
or other matter of record, is necessary to consummate and
perfect the forfeiture.
Matney v. Ratcliff, 96 Va. 231, 235 (1898).

19

Unfortunately, records of forfeiture and escheat were rarely
kept.

It is therefore impossible to identify the exact date when

the land in this chain was forfeited.

Nevertheless, Virginia

eventually became the owner of the land in this chain of title.
Virginia had gr~nted these lands in the 1600's and again in the
late 1800's.

This could only have occurred by escheat to the state

in the interim period.
The conclusion to be drawn from the evidence is that during
the 18th and 19th centuries the State of Virginia obtained title
to the entire seaboard tract that lies within the Wildlife Refuge,
with the exception of Little Island.

Private ownership of Little

Island was uninterrupted from the colonial grants to the 1938

ownership by the Princess Anne Club.
b)
(i)

Later Conveyances, 1858-1938
Long Island, Little Island, Seaboard Tract

By 1858 Edgar Burroughs held title to the lands of Long Island
and Little Island.

Using the acreage totals determined by the survey

used in the 1938 condemnation proceedings, Edgar Burroughs owned
1,367 acres of land on Long Island and Little Island.

In contrast,

acreage in the deeds to the tracts of land held by Edgar Burroughs
totaled 1,745 acres.

Acreage estimates used during the period of

the 1850's through the early 1900's by those claiming ownership to
lands later condemned in Back Bay are therefore highly suspect.
What they may indicate, however, are attempts to conceal unlawful
acquisitions of lands on the seaboard tract by eastward expansion
of valid title on Long Island and Little Island.
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Title examination

reveals that Edgar Burroughs had no interest in any lands on the
seaboard tract other than the 200 acre Little Island tract.

There

are no conveyances or grants to Edgar Burroughs which would have
given him title to other land on the seaboard tract.

Furthermore,

the descriptions of the deeds to lands on Long Island and Little
Island show that his interests on the seaboard tract were limited
to Little Island.
In 1866, John J. Burroughs, executor of the estate of
Edgar Burroughs, sold to Benjamin Wood "all thosE~ several tracts
and parcels of land, marshes and sand beach known by the name of
'Long Island' and 'Little Island' hereinbefore described containing
in the whole about nineteen hundred acres."

Deed Book 48, page 283.

Though the acreage total had increased to 1,900 acres, Benjamin
Wood's interest is limited to Long Island and Little Island.
(Appendix

1, Figure 3).

sold his interest

Ten years later in 1876 Benjamin Wood

in the lands of Back Bay.

In the intervening

years of 1866 through 1876, Wood unsuccessfully attempted to
purchase the lands of the seaboard tract from the Board of Public
Works of the Conunonwealth of Virginia.

Robert E. Nash, who had been earlier conunissioned in 1866
by the Board of Public Works of Virginia to surv,ey all waste
and unappropriated lands in Back Bay, represented Benjamin Wood
before the Board of Public Works.

On four occasions during the

year of 1870, Nash petitioned the Board to approve "the purchase
of certain state land for the Hon. Benj. Wood".

(Emphasis added).

Letter of July 5, 1870, from Nash to Board of Public Works.

Nash

went on to describe the land he wished to purchase for Wood in his
letter to the Board;
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Beginning at a place known as 'Sand Bridge' which
is about five miles southwardly from Rudee and running
along the Ocean line of the state survey southwardly
to the . . . N. Carolina line, thence along said
Carolina line West to Back Bay, thence North Westwardly
along said Bay and the line of the state survey to the
Sand Bridge road to the Beginning supposed to contain
six hundred acres.
Nash offered $600 to the Board for this seaboard tract as agent for
Wood.

(Nash had earlier estimated this same area to contain 6,000

acres which closely approximates the actual acreage today.)
On July 28, 1870, Nash petitioned Mr. DeWitt, Secretary
of the Board of Public Works, to gain approval for a purchase of
what he now estimated to be 650 acres for the benefit of Benjamin
Wood.

Nash offered $650 and stated that though he "thought it

better the Board should retain possession of this land to go with

Back Bay,"

(emphasis added) the land was of little value and the

state would benefit more by the sale.
On September 10, 1870, W.

w.

Forbes, an agent of Benjamin Wood,

petitioned the Board of Public Works to sell "a certain quantity
of land lying in Back Bay, which belongs to the State of Virginia.
I offer 650 dollars, estimating the quantity of land to be 650 acres."
(Emphasis added).
The letters to the Board of Public Works during 1870
unquestionably indicate state ownership of the seaboard tract.

In

addition, a survey of the waste and unappropriated lands in Back
Bay prepared in 1867 by Robert Nash, official surveyor for the Board
of Public Works, certified the State of Virginia's ownership of the
seaboard tract.

Documents based on the Nash survey were officially

certified in 1871 by the Princess Anne County Clerk, the Magistrate
for the City of Norfolk and the Surveyor for Princess Anne County.
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Despite the efforts of Nash and Forbes, Benjamin Wood was
never able to purchase these lands from the State of Virginia.
In 1876 Benjamin Wood conveyed his 1,900 acres of Long Island
and Little Island to Jacob Travis, stating that it is "the same
premises conveyed by John J. Burroughs, Executor of Edgar Burroughs,
to said Benjamin Wood."

Deed Book 52, page 280.

However,

in the deed to Travis, the description encompassed more than the
tract conveyed by Burroughs to Wood.

It now included the area which

begins on the Atlantic Ocean, runs due west to the northern tip of
Long Island, follows the Great Narrows and the Little Narrows
to the southern tip of Long Island, and then proceeds due east to
the Atlantic Ocean.
Island (Appendix

Wood sold not only Long Island and Little

1, Figure 3), but also the entirety of the

seaboard tract which lay east of Long Island without ever having
these lands validly conveyed to him.

(Appendix

1, Figure 4).

Wood had received compensation for an additional 1,046 acres to
which he had no title.
Princess Anne Club acreage condemned in 1938
less 1911 Barbour conveyance to Princess Anne
Club

3,113 acres
700 acres
2,413 acres
- 1,367 acres

Total acreage Wood conveyed to Travis
less actual acreage owned by Wood
Ungranted state lands claimed by the Princess
Anne Club at the time of the condemnation

1,046 acres

In 1894 Travis sold this "1,900 acre" tract (in actuality
containing 3,113 acres) to the Kimballs who in 1896 conveyed the
same land to the Princess Anne Club.

Throughout these conveyances,

the same acreage total of 1,900 acres was used to refer to the
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three tracts (Long Island, Little Island, Seaboard Tract).

Also,

the identical description used by Wood in his conveyance to Travis
in 1876 was used in these subsequent conveyances (described as
encompassing the lands from the Atlantic Ocean, to the Great
Narrows, to the Little Narrows and back to the Atlantic Ocean).
Reviewing the land assessment figures for the Princess Anne
Club as contained in the Virginia Beach Land Books (see following
exhibit) demonstrates that the land acreage totals were incorrect.
From the period of 1903 to 1914, the Princess Anne Club was
assessed with 1,900 acres on "Long Island".

In 1914 when the

Princess Anne Club acquired 700 acres from William Barbour, the
700 acres were referred to as "Back Bay".

This land assessment

remained essentially the same through 1926.

At that time the land

descriptions were changed to Little Island and Long Island;
however, the acreage totals were not changed.

The tax advantage

that the Princess Anne Club enjoyed by the acreage discrepancy is
apparent.

But furthermore, the 1926 change effectively concealed

the earlier loss of Virginia's property rights on the seaboard
tract.

The land ownership of the seaboard tract was labeled

as "Little Island", which is the small 200 acre area on that tract,
where in reality the Princess Anne Club occupied an additional
1,046 acres on that seaboard tract.
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EXHIBIT
Virginia Beach Land Books Tax Assessment

*

*

*

*

bearing
from
courthouse

changes

1903

P.A. Club

1903

Wm. Barbour
Geo. Tenney

1910

P.A. Club

1910

Wm. Barbour
Geo. Tenney

1914

miles

Long Island

1,900 acres

S.E.

14

Back Bay

1,400 acres

S.E.

18

Long Island

1,900 acres

S.E.

14

Back Bay

1,400 acres

S.E.

18

P.A. Club
P.A. Club

Long Island
Back Bay

1,900 acres
700 acres

s.
S.E.

15
20

1914

J.E. Barbour

Back Bay

700 acres

S.E.

20

1916

P.A. Club

Long Island
Back Bay

1,900 acres
700 acres

1917

P.A. Club

Long Island
Back Bay

1,900 acres
700 acres

1918

P.A. Club

Long Island
Back Bay

1,900 acres
694 acres

1919

P.A. Club

Long Island
Back Bay

1,900 acres
694 acres

1920

P.A. Club

Long Island
Back Bay

1,900 acres
694 acres

1921

P.A. Club

Long Island
Back Bay

1,900 acres
694 acres

1922

P.A. Club

Long Island
Back Bay

1,900 acres
694 acres

1923

P.A. Club

Long Island
Back Bay

1,900 acres
694 acres

1924

P.A. Club

Long Island
Back Bay

1,900 acres
694 acres

1925

P.A. Club

Long Island
Back Bay

1,900 acres
694 acres

1926

P.A. Club

Little Island
Little Island
Long Island

419 acres
1,481 acres
694 acres

&

&
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EXHIBIT (continued)

1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938

Remains Unchanged

According the the Land Books in Princess Anne County, the
Princess Anne Club owned 1,900 acres as "Long Island" in 1910.
In the same year William Barbour is assessed with 1,400 acres
as "Back Bay", bearing southeast, 18 miles from the courthouse.
It is known that this 1,400 acres is on the seaboard tract, with the
upper half being within the Refuge.
According to the Deed Books in Princess Anne County, William
Barbour and J.E. Barbour agreed to a partition of the 1,400 acres in
1911. William Barbour took the northern 700 acres, J.E. took the
southern half.
In the same year William Barbour sold.his 700 acres
to the Princess Anne Club (P.A. Club).
The Land Books of 1914 reflect these transactions. The Princess
Anne Club is assessed with 1,900 acres as "Long Island" and with
700 acres as "Back Bay". The 700 acres bears southeast 20 miles from
the courthouse. William Barbour is no longer a land owner in this
district and J.E. Barbour has 700 acres as "Back Bay". J.E.
Barbour's land bears southeast 20 miles from the courthouse.
It is, therefore, evident that the 700 acres assessed to the
Princess Anne Club in 1914 is the same 700 acres previously owned
by William Barbour and not part of the tract, further north, which
the Princess Anne Club acquired from Laura Kimball.
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2.

The Barbour Hill Tract

The Barbour Hill Tract was located on the oceanfront barrier
beach partially within the area condemned for the Back Bay
National Wildlife Refuge.

It was bounded on the east by the

Atlantic Ocean, west by Back Bay, north by a line due east from
the Little Narrows,and south by land granted to Otis Ewell.
This tract was comprised of three separate Virginia land grants,
all made after 1873.

According to the original grants these

parcels contained 278.2 acres in all.
The earliest grant was made to George W. Dawley on May 8,
1880.

This grant was said to involve 195 acres bounded on the

east by a narrow strip of "sand land" and on the west by Back Bay.
(Appendix

1, Figure 8).

The second grant was made to James M. Malbone, et al. on
August 26, 1885.

This grant was said to involve an 82-acre parcel

adjoining Dawley's grant to the east.

The land in the Malbone,

et al. tract therefore represented the narrow strip of "sand land'!
described above, and was described as "lying on the Atlantic
Ocean."

(Appendix

1, Figure 8).

William Barbour acquired three-fourths interest in the Dawley
and Malbone, et al. tracts by 1900.

He then received the third

grant along with George W. Tenney on March 14, 1902.

This grant

involved only 1.2 acres bordering Back Bay on the west.
Although the sum total of the grants was said to involve only
278.2 acres, William Barbour conveyed an interest in the same lands
as 1,300 acres in May of 1902.
than the 278.2 figure.

His count·was much more accurate

The Malbone, et al. pa.rc1el, for example,

contained at least three times the acreage reported in the grant.
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In 1909, William Barbour, et al. recorded a dividing line
agreement made with the Princess Anne Club, owners of property
to the north.

The parties to the agreement set Barbour's northern

boundary as a line running east from Little Narrows to the Atlantic
Ocean.

In November of 1911 William Barbour and John E. Barbour re-

corded a partition agreement dividing the Barbour Hill Tract in
half, east to west.

John took the southern portion and William

took the northern part.
William Barbour sold his portion to the Princess Anne Club
in December of 1911.

(The club then acquired the remaining

one-fourth interest in 1938 from the heirs of George Tenney).
This portion was later condemned by the United States.

The

partition line between William and John Barbour's land therefore
formed part of the southern boundary of the Wildlife Refuge.
It is impossible to determine the actual acreage of the
condemned portion using only the deeds of conveyance.

The 1911

Barbour/Princess Anne Club conveyance does, however, allow for a
reasonable approximation.
to the Princess Anne Club.

Barbour conveyed 6,646 feet of oceanfront
By using this length measurement and

estimating the width by scale, the northern end appears to be
about 5,000 feet wide extending from the Atlantic Ocean to Back
Bay.

This calculation results in an acreage total of between

700 and 750 acres in the portion condemned.

This figure is

verified by the tax assessment books in the Clerk's Office of
Virginia Beach.

William Barbour was assessed with 700 acres in

Back Bay after the 1911 partition.
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The discrepancy between the state's total acreage (278.2)
in the grants and the actual acreage (1,400) cannot be explained
by the information available.

Despite the growth in acreage totals

the descriptions remain the same throughout the chain of title.
Therefore, the three grants (Malbone, et al., Dawley, Barbour)
made by the State of Virginia comprised the land that William
Barbour eventually acquired.
There are some serious problems with the title to the Barbour
Hill Tract.

The "82 acre" grant to James M. Malbone, et al.

in 1885 appears to have been in violation of the 1873 statute.
(Appendix

1, Figure 5).

According to that statute, "all the beds

of the bays, rivers and creeks, and the shores of the sea" within
the State of Virginia would remain in the property of the Commonwealth
and could be used as a common by its people for fishing and fowling.
(Appendix

7).

The "sand land" described in the 9rant to Malbone,

et al. would seem to qualify as "the shores of the sea".

Moreover,

the Dawley tract was granted five years earlier, leaving unappropriated
this strip of "sand land" along the ocean to the east.

Perhaps

this exclusion was made to comply with the 1873 statute.
The "195 acre" Dawley grant may have been in violation of the
1873 statute as a grant of the bed of Back Bay.

The actual western

boundary of the land in this tract follows the meanders of ~he
shore of Back Bay.

The boundary described in the grant however is

a straight line just off the shore suggesting that a part of the bed
of the bay has been included in the grant.
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3.

Ragged Island Tract

The Ragged Island Tract is comprised of 800 acres of islands
and marsh lands in Back Bay bounded on the east by East Bay; on
the west by Red Head Bay; on the north by Little Narrows; and on
the south by Cedar Island Gap.
Original colonial grants to these lands totaled 801 acres:
50 acres granted in 1690 to Joseph Perry; 250 acres granted in
1733 to Edward Hack Mosely, Henry Holmes, and John Jemason; and
551 acres granted in 1738 to Edward Hack Mosely.

The early

history of the title to Ragged Island is extremely fragmented,
yet ownership of the 800 acres of Ragged Island remained with
private individuals until the acquisition of these lands by the
United States in 1938.
Through a complicated series of devises and conveyances during
the 1850's and 1860's, title to the 800 acres became uncertain and
a suit was brought in 1889 to establish absolute title to this land.
Ivers Adams v. Tenney, Woodbury, Knowlton and Franklin, Deed Book 60,
page 620.

Specific allegations in the suit are not clear because

the records of the case cannot be located at the Virginia Beach
Clerk's Office.

The title examiner hired by the United States for

purposes of the condemnation in 1938 also found these records to
be missing.

In the 1938 title report by the Senior Attorney for

the Bureau of Biological Survey it was noted that although the suit
was only prima facie evidence of the passage of title, "under the
provisions of§ 6306 of the Virginia Code it would be impossible
at this late day

to disturb the title because of any defects

arising out of that suit."

Opinion and Report:

Ragged Island

Club, Inc., prepared by Ralph J. Luttrell, Senior Attorney, Bureau
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of Biological Survey, March 22, 1938.
(1977 Repl. Vol.)

Va. Code Ann.

§

8.01-113

(referred to by Mr. Luttrell as§ 6306) states:

If a sale of property be made under a decree or order
of a court, and such sale be confirmed, the title of the
purchaser at such sale shall not be disturbed unless
within twelve months from such confirmation, the sale
be set aside by the trial court or an appeal be allowed
by the Supreme Court of Appeals, and an order or decree
be therein afterwards entered requiring such sale to
be set aside but there may be restitution of the proceeds
of sale to those entitled.
The chancery court in the above mentioned suit of Adams v.
Tenney, et al. ordered in 1891 that all lands in Ragged Island be
sold by Special Commissioners at a public auction.
bidder was the Ragged Island Club, Inc.

The highest

The Club therefore took

absolute title to the 800 acres by virtue of Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-113
(1977 Repl. Vol.) as there was never any motion to have the
commissioners sale set aside.

Some 47 years lab=r the Ragged

Island Club, Inc. conveyed by general warranty deed the 800 acres
of Ragged Island to the United States.
The chain of title to Ragged Island presents, therefore, no
basis for formulating a legal claim by the State of Virginia
against the United States.
4.

Back Bay Gunning Club Tract

The Back Bay Gunning Club Tract identifies all of the land
within the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge which is located west
of the Great Narrows.

It consists of several irregular,predominantly

marsh,islands.
Land grants were made of this area as early as 1840.

The

majority of the land was patented to Luke Hill and Peter Land.
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Title descended from these and other grantors until 1898 when
Joseph Seelinger initiated his acquisition of the entire tract.
By 1912 Seelinger had bought and sold all of the privately
owned land in Back Bay west of the Great Narrows.

In December of

1899 he combined two tracts of land which were originally described
as containing 582 acres and 100 acres.

His description of these

two tracts totaled 1,000 acres when he conveyed his remaining
two tracts, of 77 acres and 140.2 acres, to the Club.
The Gunning Club received a land grant from the State of
Virginia in 1905.

This involved an eight-acre marsh island

adjacent to Deep Creek Cove near the western shore of Back Bay.
(Appendix

1, Figure 6).

The addition of this grant to the

conveyances from Seelinger made the Club the sole owner of the
land in this entire tract.
In May of 1930, the Back Bay Gunning Club sold all of its
interest in this area to Charles Mcveigh, who was associated with
the Princess Anne Club.

Mcveigh and the Princess Anne Club owned

this tract at the time of the federal government's condemnation.
According to the government's survey, this tract contained only
663 acres.

The discrepancy between the government's acreage total

and the 1,225 acres conveyed by the Back Bay Gunning Club can be
explained in part by Seelinger's actions.

His conveyance of 1899

to the Back Bay Gunning Club added over 300 acres to the actual total
involved.

Explanation of the remaining 250 acre discrepancy can

be only supposition.

This difference may be due to inaccuracies

in land surveys made prior to 1840.
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The potential problem with the Club's title involves the
eight-acre grant in 1905.

This was a grant of marsh land on the

eastern shore of Virginia made after the 1888 statute possibly precluding such grants.

According to that statute "all unappropriated

marsh or meadow lands lying on the eastern shore of Virginia,
which have remained ungranted, and which have been used as a
common by the people . . . shall remain ungranted."

(Appendix 6). In light

of this, the 1905 grant to the Back Bay Gunning Club may have been
invalid.

If so, the State of Virginia owned the eight acres

at the time of the condemnation.
C.

(Appendix

1, Figure 6).

FEDERAL PURCHASES AND CONDEMNATIONS

In order to facilitate an understanding of the events leading
up to and culminating in the condemnation of the Back Bay National
Wildlife Refuge, major events have been set out chronologically
below.

A discussion of the key areas follows:

1929 - Congress passed the Migratory Bird Conservation Act.
1930 - The Virginia Legislature passed the first of three
statutes relating to the acquisition of state lands.
1936 - The Virginia Legislature passed the second consentrelated statute.
12/17/1936 - The United States reached a purchase agreement with
the Princess Anne Club for 4,479 acres in Back Bay.
5/25/1937 - The United States Department of Agriculture Bureau of
Biological Survey completed and certified a map of the
Princess Anne Club Tracts showing state and colonial
grants. State grants on the barrier beach are grossly
in error.
10/29/1937 - The Virginia Title and Mortgage Corporation certified
a title search of the Princess Anne Club Tracts for the
United States.
- Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation of Richmond,
Virginia issued two certificates of title to the United
States for the Princess Anne Club Tracts.
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12/22/1937 - A declaration of taking was filed by the United States
for Princess Anne Club tract lands east of the Great
Narrows, 3,113.52 acres.
2/25/1938 - Title was vested in the United States to 3,113.52
acres east of the Great Narrows by virtue of condemnation.
3/1/1938 - A Purchase Agreement was made between the United States
and the Ragged Island Club for 812 acres in Back Bay at
a cost of $55,000.
3/12/1938 - A letter from the U.S. Attorney General stated that the
condemnation proceedings were conducted regularly and
that title to the 3,113.52 acres was vested in the
United States.
3/31/1938 - The Virginia Legislature passed the third consentrelated statute.
4/28/1938 - B. P. Holland executed a quit-claim deed to Charles
Mcveigh, selling all interest he might have had to
land within the area to be condemned.
(He claimed
an interest to land in the 663 acre tract.)
5/16/1938 - In a letter to the U.S. Attorney in Richmond, the U.S.
Attorney General relayed a recommendation that a final
judgment of condemnation be had as a quit-claim deed
from B. P. Holland would not clear up all technical
difficulties with the title.
5/17/1938 - Title was vested in the United States to Ragged Island
by virtue of a deed of bargain and sale.
8/18/1938 - Title was vested in the United States to land west of
~he Great Narrows.
(663.24 acres by virtue of
condemnation.)
11/4/1938 - A letter from the U.S. Attorney General stated that the
condemnation proceedings were conducted regularly and
that title to the 663.24 acres was vested in the United
States.
1939-1941

- Bailey v. Holland - B. P. Holland brought suit against
the manager of the Refuge claiming an interest in the
western portion of Back Bay. Holland did not prevail.

10/16/1939 - Largely in response to claims such as Holland's the
Presidential Proclamation was issued on this date
redefining the boundaries of the Refuge and closing
the waters therein.
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When Congress passed the Migratory Bird Conservation
Act, 16 U.S.C.

§

715 et seq. in 1929, it autho:rized the purchase

or rental of areas for use as sanctuaries.

The act requires

explicit state consent to such acquisitions:
[N]o deed or instrument of conveyance shall be
accepted by the Secretary*** under this Act
unless the State in which the area lies shall
have consented by law to the acquisition by the
United States of lands in that State. Id. at
§ 715f.
Allowing the state a right of consent in federal acquisitions
by condemnation is a unique departure from the general rule and
should be accorded great weight.
In 1930 the General Assembly "assented" to the "provisions and
requirements of the said Migratory Bird Conservation Act in so far
as is necessary for the purpose of such conveyance, acceptance and
acquisition . .

II

The Commission of Game and Inland Fisheries

was "authorized, empowered and directed to do all things necessary
to bring about the establishment of a bird sanctuary under the
provisions of said act . . . " (Emphasis added).

Sess. Acts., 1930,Ch. 272.

(Appendix 9). "Assent" has been held to differ from "consent".
Consent implies some positive action while assent means mere
passivity or submission which does not include consent.
Perez, 108 Cal. Rptr. 474, 510 P.2d 1026 (1973).

People v.

A fair reading

of the 1930 Act would seem to indicate it was qualified or
conditional in nature.
The apparent reserved "assent" given by the Virginia General
Assembly in the 1930 Act contrasts markedly with language incorporated
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by the statutes of at least four other states clearly giving
state consent for

the acquisition of land for the establishment

of federal wildlife refuges.

(Appendix 10).

The uniformity of

language found in the statutes of these states was due to efforts
by the Department of Agriculture immediately following enactment
of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act in 1929.

The Department

sent to each state a model draft of a consent provision which
complied with the consent requirement of the Migratory Bird
Conservation Act (16 u.s.c. § 715f).

Pers. Comm., Walter Mccallister,

Secretary, Migratory Bird Commission and Chief, Division-of
Realty, Fish

&

Wildlife Service.

the model draft.

Apparently most states adopted

Virginia did not.

In 1936, two years prior to the condemnation, the General
Assembly spoke again and more clearly on the issue of state
consent to federal condemnation.
The Act referred to as the 1936 Act (March 28, 1936) had
as its preamble:

"An Act to amend and re-enact Sections 18 and

19 of the Code of Virginia relating to the acquisition of lands by
the United States of America, . . . "

(Appendix 11).

The amending of

section 18 is irrelevant for the purposes of this report.

The 1936

Act, however, made several significant changes in section 19.
First, the original section 19 began "The consent of the State
is hereby given to the acquisition by the United States,

"

The same line appears in the 1936 act as "The conditional consent
of the Commonwealth of Virginia is hereby given . . . "
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Second; the General Assembly in the original section 19
consented to acquisitions by "purchase, lease, condemnation
or otherwise ., . . "

The 1936 Act read:

"

. by purchase,

lease, or in cases where it is appropriate that the United States
exercise the power of eminent domain, then by condemnation."
Clearly, this change sought to lessen the nwnber of
situations where the state would consent to the United States
acquiring land in Virginia by condemnation.
The third and perhaps most important change involved which lands
may be taken.

The General Assembly in the original section 19

consented to land acquired"
politic or corporate

from any individual, body

. for the conservation of the forests or
II

natural resources of the State

The 1936 Act only named

"land in Virginia from any individual, firm, association
or private corporation
or natural resources.

. for the conservation of the forests
II

By dropping the term "body politic or corporate" which applied
to municipalities, counties, and states, by any adding "private

corporation(s)" the legislature made its intent clear. It sought
to remove from the possibility of acquisition by the United States
all state owned or public lands.
Of course, when the United States seeks to condemn land, the

state legislature may not burden or restrict it without federal
consent to do so.

U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; United States v.

Crary, 1 F. Supp. 406 (W.Do Va. 1932).

In the case of the Migratory

Bird Conservation Act ~uch consent was given.
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Therefore, the 1936 enactment of the General Assembly could
only have been addressed to acquisitions under federal act such
as the Migratory Bird Conservation Act which specifically requires
state consent.

To assume otherwise would be to construe the state

Act as unconstitutional on its face.

And" • • . statutes should be

construed whenever possible so as to uphold their constitutionality."
United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
On March 28, 1936 this state legislation came into force.
The last sentence of this Act reads:

"An emergency existing in that

lands in Virginia are constantly being acquired by the United
States, this act shall be in force from its passage."

Nine months

later on December 17, 1936 the federal government initiated
procedures to acquire the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge.
In 1938 after title had vested in the federal government for
part of the Refuge, the General Assembly enacted a statute
releasing "all rights and authority which the Commonwealth of
Virginia may have or possess concerning wildlife except fish and
oysters . . . "

Sess. Acts, 1938, Ch.

areas comprising the Refuge.

388,

(Appendix 12) in the

The General Assembly specifically

provided in section 2 of this enactment that the ceding of state
jurisdiction was governed by section 19-a, Ch. 382 of the Acts of
Assembly of 1936, the act giving consent for condemnation of lands
other than those owned by the state.

The 1938 Act,by specifically

dealing with the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge condemnation
and specifically ceding jurisdiction under the terms of the 1936
statute, further supports the argument that state consent has to
be measured by the 1936 statute of the General Assembly.
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Ch. 382,

Acts of Assembly, 1936.

Measured by that statute, no consent

was giyeil for the condemnation of state lands.
There is evidence to suggest that, at the time of the
condemnation, the United States knew or should have known that
the State of Virginia had an interest in lands in Back Bay.
In 1936 the United States and the Princess Anne Club engaged
in a Purchase Agreement for the lands within the Princess Anne
Club tract.

Clause eight of that agreement provided that:
. . . if the Attorney General determines that the
title to said lands or any part thereof should be
acquired by judicial proceedings, either to procure
a safe title or to obtain title more quickly, or for
other reason, then the compensation to be claimed by
the owners . . . shall be upon the basis of the
purchase price herein provided.

Unlike Ragged Island, which was purchased after such an agreement,
the Princess Anne Club tract was later acquired by judicial
proceedings (condemnation).

In light of clause eight it would

appear that the United States was not satisfied with the title
to the Princess Anne Club tract.
At first glance it would appear that the United States was
concerned only with the interest of B. P. Holland in the Princess
Anne Club tract.

This however was not the case.

At the time of

the Refuge acquisition, Holland claimed an interE~st in some of
the lands west of Great Narrows.

In April of 1938, the

Princess Anne Club in an effort to clear their title, received a
quit-claim deed from B. P. Holland.

The quit-claim conveyed all

right, title and interest "in and to land in Princess Anne County,
Virginia which the United States seeks to acquire for the
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establishment of the Back Bay Migratory Waterfowl Project.
and particularly

. in and to the lands shown as tracts

Numbers 39a-t, 39Aa, 39b, 39c and 39d . . . "
Virginia Beach.

Book 192, page 229 -

Despite this deed the United States opted to

condemn the land.
Additional evidence suggesting that the United States was
concerned with more than just Holland's claim can be found in a
letter of May 1939 from the Assistant U.S. Attorney General
to the U.S. Attorney in Richmond.

The U.S. Attorney was informed

that
A copy of your letter was furnished the Solicitor,
Department of Agriculture, for his information and
his office has informally advised this Department

they they feel that a verdict should be had in the
proceedings determining compensation and a final
judgment of condemnation entered based on the verdict
as a quitclaim deed from B.P. Holland and his wife,
Emily G. Holland, will not clear up all technical
difficulties in the title.
(Emphasis added).
This letter does not explain just what the technical difficulties
were.
A letter from the Acting Secretary of the Interior to the
U.S. Attorney General in June of 1940 provides further evidence of
the existence of "technical difficulties."

The letter, relating

to the Holland v. Bailey case, 126 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1942) gives
a brief history of the Refuge condemnation.

In so doing the writer

mentioned that "[t]he Bureau of Biological Survey caused the land
described within the option to be surveyed and had an abstract of
title thereto made.
unsatisfactory."

The title, after examination, was found to be

He did not explain why.
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Our examination of the

existing evidence and the abstract of title indicates that the only
possible claimant to lands claimed by the Princess Anne Club
was the State of Virginia.
The evidence mentioned thus far suggests that the United
States had knowledge of problems with the Princess Anne Club's
title.

The major piece of evidence which suggests that the United

States should have known of the state's interest on the seaboard
tract is also the most perplexing.

(See the section on the

title to the Princess Anne Club tracts, supra.)

That evidence

is a 1937 map labeled "Princess Anne Club Tracts" to which the
Bureau of Biological Survey added the location of state and
colonial grants.

This map was contained in the official records

of the condemnation.
According to this map the entire seaboard tract was granted
by the state from the northern to the southern boundaries of the
Refugeo

This representation is incorrect.

The federal map

misrepresents the location of the Malbone, et al. and Dawley
tracts.
First, it is clear from glancing at the map (Appendix

1,

Figure 7) that the 82 acre Malbone, et al. tract is much larger
than the 195 acre Dawley tract.

Although these tracts contained

much more than their originally alleged acreage, they were
proportional in size.
Second, the Malbone, et·al. and Dawley tracts (hereinafter
Barbour tract) as placed on the federal map are located too far
north on the seaboard tract.

When Laura Kimball sold the seaboard

tract to the Princess Anne Club, the southern boundary was a line
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due east from the Little Narrows to the ocean.

The Barbour

tract used this line as its northern boundary.

In other words the

Barbour tract, as depicted on this map, has as its southern
boundary what actually should be its northern boundary.

Further

evidence of the true location of these tracts can be found in the
dividing line agreement between William Barbour and the Princess
Anne Club of 1909, Deed Book 82, page 385, Virginia Beach.

The

line set there runs almost due east through the Little Narrows.
The land which William Barbour eventually conveyed to the
Princess Anne Club is 6,646 feet of ocean front from the dividing
line south.

The federal govermnent acknowledged the existence

of this dividing line agreement on a "Tract Ownership Data" form
made in reference to the purchase agreement with the Princess Anne
Club in 1936.
Third, the 1880 Dawley grant as depicted on this map
encompassed Little Island.

This cannot be correct since a chain

of title to Little Island has been established back to a colonial
grdnt, and at no time did it involve George Dawley.
Fourth, the land which the map depicted as the "Barbour tract"
was the same land owned by Jacob Travis.

If the government map

was correct, Jacob Travis would have held title to the same land
granted by the state to Dawley and Malbone, et al. in the 1880's.
Fifth, in a 1937 report labeled "Description of the Boundary
of the Princess Anne Club Tract (39)"

(contained in the condemnation

records), the Assistant Cadastral Enqineer for the Bureau of
Biological Survey described this Princess Anne Club tract as "Being
all of the . . . .Malbone,
1885,

[et al.] 82 acre grant dated August 26,

[and1 the George W. Dawley 195 acre grant dated May 8, 1880
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abstract

(Emphasis added).

From the United States' own title

(prepared by Virginia Title and Mortgage Corp.), it is

clear that the Princess Anne Club never acquired all of the
Malbone, et al. and Dawley grants.

Rather, they bought

approximately one-half of the land involved .in each grant which
would mean that these tracts would be cut approximately in half by
the southern boundary of the Refuge.

(Appendix

1, Figure 8).

It is important to note that the area on this map labeled
George Wo Dawley 195 acres and James Malbone 82 acres is the same
area (excepting Little Island) which was wrongfully claimed by
virtue of the Wood to Travis conveyance.
granted by the State of Virginia.

This area was never

The map prepared by the Bureau

of Biological Survey depicted these tracts incorrectly as to
size and location with the result that these two tracts covered
the exact area to which the State of Virginia has a claim.
Reference is made in a letter dated February 10, 1938, from the
Secretary of Agriculture to the U.S. Attorney General to the
enclosure of two certificates of title issued by Lawyers Title

Insurance Corporation of Richmond on October 29, 1937.
the two certificates of title have not been located.

To date

They could not

be found in the records of the Department of Interior, Department
of Justice or the Regional Office of the Fish and Wildlife Service.
The Regional Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, Robert
Miller, has given Lawyers Title permission to make public the
certificates of title,and Lawyers Title has agreed to search their
records for the certificates.

The certificates are significant in

that they may help explain why the Princess Anne Club's title was
deemed unsatisfactory.
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V.

POTENTIAL STATE CLAIMS

A.

SUBSTANTIVE THEORY

1.

Due Process of Law

a)

Claim to Compensation

Eminent domain is the power of a sovereign to take property
for public use without the owner's consent.
Eminent Domain,

(3d.ed.,1981), § 1.11.

Nichol's, The Law of

The powers which are

vested in the federal government by the Constitution require for
their exercise the acquisition of lands in all states.
United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).

Kohl v.

However, the Constitution

places limitations upon the federal government's acquisition of
land through the Fifth Amendment:

"No person

. shall be

deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."

The guaranty of the due process clause inures

to the benefit of a state, Wyoming

Ve

United States, 255 U.S. 489

(1921), while under the just compensation clause, the public
property of a state is "private property," thereby disallowing any
taking without compensation.

Nahant v. United States, 136 F. 873

(1st Cir. 1905); Wayne County v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 417
(1918), aff'd., 252 U.S. 574 (1920).
The title examination prepared for the United States for the
purposes of condemnation in 1938 showed the questionable nature of
the title held by the Princess Anne Club.

That Virginia, and only

Virginia, could make a legitimate claim against the Princess Anne
Club is evident from these title records.
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That the United States

was aware or should have been aware of Virginia's claim in 1938
is evident from an examination of condemnation records.

Many

references to the inadequacy of the title held by the Princess
Anne Club exist within these records.

Furthermore, the map

prepared by the federal government is remarkable for either being
an intentional masking of the Corrunonwealth's claims or for being
an example of a higher order of negligence.

Such evidence is

thoroughly detailed in the section of this report on the
Federal Condemnation, Section III, C, supra.
Since the 1936 Acts of the Virginia Assembly specifically
barred the acquisition of state-owned lands by the federal
government, the United States was put on notice that it had no
authority to acquire such lands.

Where a potential state claim was

apparent from the abstract of title, the United States as condemnor
had the duty to give Virginia notice of this claim to allow Virginia
the right to a hearing on compensation.

The in rem nature of the

condemnation proceeding could not relieve the United States of the
necessity of providing notice to the state which had an interest
in the land.

As Circuit Judge Phillips noted in his opinion in the

case of Fulcher v. United States, 287 F.2d 278, 287

(4th Cir. 1980),

"it simply is no longer the law that the existence of in rem
jurisdiction 'over the property itself' relieves of any necessity
to give more than fictive notice to persons having interests in
the property, in order to extinguish those interests."
The constitutional standard requiring notice to interested
parties was promulgated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 214 (1950).
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An elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all
circumstances to apprise interested parties of the
penden~y of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections.
The Supreme Court in the case of Walker v. City of Hutchinson,
352 U.S. 112 (1956), followed the Mullane decision where it held
that a landowner was entitled to notice of the condemnation proceedings against his property because he was a resident whose address
was known to the condemnor.

Notice by only newspaper publication

was not sufficient to satisfy due process of law.

Justice Black

writing for the Court referred to the Mullane decision as
establishing "the rule that, if feasible, notice must be reasonably

calculated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and
adversely affect their legally protected interest."
See, Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208

Id. at 115.

(1962),

(notice

of a condemnation which was limited to newspaper publication
where the diversion of a river would affect the owner's land,
violated due process where name and address of owner was readily
ascertainable.)
Therefore, Fifth Amendment due process standards required that
Virginia, as a claimant to the lands in Back Bay, be notified
of the hearing on compensation where its interests would be
adversely affected.

Mere publication of notice was not sufficient

notice to foreclose the State of Virginia's claims to Back Bay.
If proper notice had been given in 1938 to the State of Virginia,
it would have had the options to contest the proposed taking of
state owned lands, to insist on compensation for the taking, or
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merely to acquiesce in the taking of such state-owned lands by the
federal government.

However, the option belonged to~the State of

Virginia to decide how best to control these lands in Back Bay and
when the United States foreclosed Virginia's consideration of such
options by not giving proper notice of its claim, the subsequent
acquisition by the United States was violative of due process of
law.
Claim to Title

b)

Procedural defects in notice to condemnation proceedings
give rise to actions seeking just compensation.

The Fifth

Amendment due process clause preserves for thE~ a9qrieved parties
the right to a hearing on corq.pensation 6 but the _in rem nature of
the proceeding effectively vests title in the condemner.
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208

(1962)

9

See,

However,

the Fourth Circuit in the case of United States v. Chatham, 323
F.2d 95

(4th Cir~ 1963), held that notice which did not meet the

standards of Mullane

not only permitted a claim for just

compensation but also permitted a claim to the title of the
condemned land$
608 F.2d 708

See also, United States v. 88.28 Acres of Land,

(7th Cir. 1979)

(want of adequate notice allowed an

attack on a government condemnation title in a quiet title action
under

§

2409a).

In the Chatham case there was only notice by publication.
Relying on Mullane, the court easily found a due process right to
notice of a hearing on compensation and stated that "service by
publication is not an adequate substitute for actual notice, when
giving actual notice to identified parties is neither impossible,
Chatham at 9B.

impractical, nor unreasonable."
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But th€ go"<.rernment

in its published notice inaccurately described the land intended
for condemnation.
.

The court noted that "if each of the

[land owners]

. • . with a lawyer at his elbow, had read the

published notice, they would not have surmised that their lands
were involved."

Id. at 99.

The court in Chatham concluded that

notice was so deficient in its description of the land to be
condemned, that it was "positively misleading".

Therefore the

condemnation court, whose jurisdiction was based solely on the
defectively published

notice, could not have acquired in rem

jurisdiction over the land.

Judge Haynsworth writing for the

court in Chatham stated that "when no reader of the notice could
have understood that the proceedings were directed to this land,
it cannot be an adequate foundation for an exercise of an in rem
jurisdiction over this land."

Id. at 100.

The Chatham court held

that the absence of actual notice and the gross misdescription of
the land in the published notice together were sufficient to
find title remaining in the private owners of land.
Though the facts in the Chatham case are not wholly comparable
to that of the case at hand, the principles embodied in the court's
decision are extremely pertinent.

The federal government's

misdescription of the lands rendered the condemnation court in
Chatham without in rem jurisdiction over the proceeding.

Similarly,

it can be argued that the condemnation of state-owned lands in
the present case, which were specifically reserved by the 1936
Virginia Act of Assembly, rendered the court in the 1938 Back Bay
condemnation without in rem jurisdiction over such state-owned lands.
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As argued in Section IV A. 2. of this report, ir~!ra, state-owned
lands could not be acquired by the federal government.

The

qualified consent by the State of Virginia bec~1e embodied in the·
Migratory Bird Conservation Act, thereby limiting the United
States' authority to acquire Refuge lands.

Not only would any

title acquired by the United States in state-·owned lands be void
and inoperative, but also a declaration of taking of such lands
would serve as an inadequate foundation for a.n exercise of in rem
jurisdiction.,
Furthermore, the Chatham court found the entire condemnation
procedure to have been a "gross deception" which formed the basis
for divesting the United States of any claim to title.

Similarly,

in the case at hand, the federal government which should have at
least been aware of Virginia's claim, pursued the condemnation
in 1938 without any attempt to notify Virginia.

And where

potential questions may have arisen during the condemnation
proceedings regarding Virginia 0 s claim as evident in the abstract
of title, a map was drawn and included in the condemnation
record which effectively concealed all of Virginia's claim on the
seaboard tract.

The descriptions were no less offensive here as

in the Chatham case.
Thus, the Fifth Amendment principles of due process as
promulgated in Mullane and later refined by Chatham required the
invalidation of any claim of title by the United States to stateowned lands.

Where the federal government, whether knowingly or

unknowingly, had deceptively misled interested parties from
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acquiring notice of condemnation proceedings against their land,
the condemnation court lacked in rem jurisdiction and title to
the land remained with the private owner.
2.

Statutory Interpretation/Section 715f Consent

The authority with which lands are acquired for use by
the United States derives entirely from Congress.

Under an Act of

Congress, 41 U.S.C. § 14, "no land shall be purchased on account
of the United States, except under a law authorizing such purchase."
Therefore, any conveyance of lands to the United States without
Congressional approval is void and inoperative.

United States v.

Tichenor, 12 F. 415 (C.C.D. Ore. 1882).
The authority for the acquisition of lands in Back Bay was
derived from the Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 715
et seq.

Under§ 715f of the Act, consent of the state legislature

to the federal acquisition of land is made an express condition
of the United States' acceptance of such land.

United States v.

Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, rehearing den., 329 U.S. 834 (1946);
Swan Lake Hunting Club v. United States, 381 F.2d 238

(5th Cir. 1967).

The authority of the federal government to condemn lands for the
purpose of establishing a wildlife refuge is therefore conditional
on the consent of the state, and that consent may impose a limitation
on the type of lands which may be acquired for a refuge.
The testimony during the public hearings held in 1928
prior to the passage of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act lend
credence to this aspect of a state's right to give a qualified
consent to the acquisition of land by the United States.

The Act

itself was viewed as a cooperative venture between the federal and
state governments.

As Paul Redington, Chief of the Office of
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Biological Survey stated:

"[The Act]

. . . provides for the

greatest degree of cooperation between the Federal Government and
the governments of several states in the administration and
enforcement of regulations and laws for the protection of the
migratory birds of America."
on Agriculture and Forestry,

Hearings before the Senate Committee

s.

1271, Feb. 17, 1928.

Not only did

§ 715f require state consent by law to the provisions of the Act,
but§ 715a required that either a ranking officer in charge of game
lands within the state or the governor of the state be authorized
representatives on the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission "for
the purpose of noting on all questions relating to the acquisition,
under this Act of areas in his State."

The state representative

on the Commission was there not only to foster a spirit of
cooperation, but also to protect legitimate interests of the
state in its lands.
Another indication of the state's right to qualify
consent is found in the hearings before the Senate Committee on
Commerce in 1961.

The Committee approved a $105,000,000

appropriation for the acquisition of lands under the Migratory
Bird Conservation Act under which a proviso in the bill was added
that no land could be acquired without the consent of the Governor
or the appropriate state agency.

Senator Magnuson commenting on

the proviso, stated that "it is provided that they [the Federal
Government and the State] must be in complete ag·reement as to the
nature of the lands and the acreage involved."
(May 28, 1961).

74 Cong. Rec. 117111

Considering the cooperative purpose that was
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envisioned between the Federal and State Governments at the
inception of the Act and the continuing effort that is being made
to maintain this atmosphere of cooperation, the consent clause
which is embodied in the Act clearly permits the state to limit
its consent to federal acquisition of land within the state.
The 1936 Virginia Act of Assembly gave that qualifying
consent to the United States allowing the acquisition of all land
within the state with the exception of state-owned public lands.
Therefore, since the enabling Migratory Bird Conservation Act
limited the condemning power of the United States by the imposition
of state consent, Virginia's exemption of state-owned lands from
the purview of the Act rendered the federal government without

authority to take such public lands of the state.

As such, where

the federal government holds such state lands, its title is void
and inoperative.
3.

Taking Without Compensation

The owner of property is constitutionally protected against
any taking of, interference with, impact upon, or damage to his
right to use, possess, or enjoy such property or his freedom to
dispose of such property.

This constitutional protection allows

the affected owner to bring an action recovering his loss.

Such

action has been variously characterized as a suit in "inverse
condemnation" or "reverse condemnation" or as an action based
on a "de facto" or "conunon law" taking.
Domain

§

8 . 1 [4] ,

( 3 d . ed . , 19 8 1 ) .
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Nichol's, The Law of Eminent

The concept of inverse condemnation is based on the idea
that the defendant has exercised the power of eminent domain, but
has not observed the legal processes to accomplish its purpose.
Thus, physical interference with the use, possession, and enjoyment
of property constitutes a de facto taking of the property for
which there is a constitutional obligation to make compensation.
Inverse condemnation is analogous to an action by a private
landowner against another private individual or entity to recover
title to or possession of property.

The former property owner cannot

compel return of property taken because of the eminent domain power
of the condemner but the former owner does have a constitutional
right to just compensation for what was taken.
§

Nichol's at

8.1[4].
State-owned land is considered and treated the same as

privately-owned land with regard to compensation.

The United States

cannot take state property under eminent domain proceedings without
paying appropriate compensation to the state.

The principle that

state lands will be accorded the same considerations as

priva_te

lands was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893).
The Court declared:
While a grant from one government may supercede
and abridge franchises and rights held at the will
of its granter, it cannot abridge any property
rights of a public character created by the
authority of another sovereignty. No one would
suppose that a franchise from the federal government

to a corporation state or national to construct
interstate roads or lines of travel, transportation,
or communication, would authorize it to enter upon the
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private property of an individual, and appropriate
it without compensation. No matter how broad and
comprehensive might be the terms in which the
franchise was granted, it would be confessedly
subordinate to the right of the individual not to
be deprived of his property without just compensation.
Andtheprinciple is the same when under the grant of a
a franchise from the national government, a corporation
assumes to enter upon property of a public nature
belonging to a state.
It would not be claimed, for
instance, that under a franchise from Congress to
construct and operate an interstate railroad the grantee
thereof could enter upon the statehouse grounds of the
state, and construct its depot there without paying the
value of the property thus appropriated. Although the
statehouse grounds be property devoted to public uses,
it is property devoted to the public uses of the
state, and property whose ownership and control is in
the state, and it is not within the competency of the
national government to dispossess the state of such
control and use, or appropriate the same to its own
benefit, or the benefit of any of its corporations
or grantees without suitable compensation to the
state.
Id.at 100, 101.
Regarding the payment of interest as part of just compensation,
the general rule is that no interest is allowed on claims against
the United States unless it consents.
290 U.S. 13 (1933).

Jacobs v. United States,

However, this general rule does not apply

to claims for just compensation for governmental taking.
Just compensation is provided for in the Constitution
and may not be taken away by statute.

It involves making the

owner whole, as if no taking had occurred.

With this principle in

mind, it follows that:
Where the United States condemns and takes
possession of land before ascertaining or
paying compensation, the owner is not limited
to the value of the property at the time of the
taking; he is entitled to such addition as will
produce the full equivalent of that value paid
contemporaneously with the taking.
Interest at a
proper rate is a good measure by which to ascertain
the amount so to be added.
Seaboard Airline Ry. Co.
v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 (1923).
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This view is codified in 40 U.S.C.

§

258a, a statute which

allows the United States to take title and possession to land in
advance of final judgment.

The law allows interE~st at

a

rate of

six percentum per annum on the amount finally awarded from the
date of payment; "but interest shall not be allowed on so
much thereof as shall have been paid into the court."
§

40 U.S.C.

258a.
Regarding the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge condemnation,

the government paid into the court the entire value of the land,
thus apparently precluding the state from claiming interest due.
There is, however, case law to suggest that if the United States
is responsible for a delay in the distribution of the deposited
fund, interest will be allowed.

United States v .. Certain Lands in

Suffolk County, N.Y., 270 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. N.Y. 1967).
In Fulcher v. United States, 632 S.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1980),
land was condemned under 40 U.S.C. § 258a, the same authorization
for condemning the Back Bay lands.

There, as in Back Bay, the United

States failed to determine and notify the true owner of part of the
land.

The Court of Appeals ruled that if Fulcher could show his

title to be good he would be entitled to the value of the land
at the date of the taking plus interest from that date.
4.

Ejectment Against Individual (statute of limitations,
concealment)

Another possible approach would be to bring an ejectment action
against the present manager of the Wildlife Refuge under a claim

of better title.

By naming the individual as the defendant instead

of the United States one could presumably avoid the sovereign
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immunity problem and thereby proceed without the constraints
relating to such.

This was the situation in United States v. Lee,

106 U.S. 196 (1882), a cornerstone to present day sovereign
immunity law.
Although the law since Lee has been far from consistent, it
now appears to be fairly certain that this approach is confined
to a limited number of situations.

A claim for specific relief

against the officer as an individual can be maintained in two
situations:

one, when his actions are not within his statutory

powers; two, when his actions, even if within his powers, are
violative of the Constitution.
(1962).

Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643

Hence, the Lee case has continuing validity only when a

claim is made that the holding of the property constitutes an
unconstitutional taking without just compensation.

Id.

It appears that the State of Virginia.'s situation fits neatly
into the Lee exception.

This would suggest that Virginia could

maintain an ejectment action in a state court.

There are, however,

certain important caveats involved with this approach.

Both the

land in Lee and in Malone were acquired by the United States
through a purchase.

The Back Bay Wildlife Refuge was a condemnation.

In a condemnation the United States acquires an indefeasible title
leaving only a right to compensation to the claimants.

In a

purchase, the government's title is not as inclusive.
An ejectment action would be filed in a state court.
it would then be removed to a federal district court.

Undoubtedly,

If that court

determines that the action is actually one which should be brought
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under 28 U.S.C. 2409a (allowing the United States to be named as
a defendant in an action in which it has an interest in real
property) the state court will be deemed not to have had
jurisdiction to hear the case.

Since the district court's

removal jurisdiction is only as good as the state's original
jurisdiction, the case will be dismissed.

McClellan v. Kimball,

623 F.2d 83 {9th Cir. 1980).
5.

Negligence - Federal Tort Claims Act

Through the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b),
the United States waives its inununity from tort liability in
certain cases.

Under this section the federal district courts are

given exclusive jurisdiction of claims against the United States
for money damages, for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any employee of the United States while acting within the scope
of his employrnentn
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) has been interpreted
as only waiving immunity for negligence.

Intentional torts (other

than by law enforcement officials) are not seen as being within the
scope of employment.

Virgil v. United States, 293 R Supp. 1176

(D.C. Col. 1968}; United States v. Drinkwater, 434 F. Supp. 457
(E.D. Va. 1977).
The FTCA presents a problem of limited retroactivity.

That is,

the Unitcj States has only waived immunity for claims accruing on
and after January 1, 1945.

This Act appears to eliminate any

claim arising from the 1937-38 title searches.
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However, this

section has been interpreted as allowing claims for injuries
suffered after 1945 which resulted from pre-negligence.

In Re:

Silver Bridge Disaster Litigation, 381 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. W. Va.
1974).

Thus, Virginia must demonstrate that injury did not

occur until its claim was discovered, which was after 1945.
6.

Public Trust/Custom

The public trust doctrine was recognized early in our United
States case law as applied to land beneath navigable waters and
the adjacent shoreline.
land

The doctrine basically asserts that

under navigable waters is owned by the sovereign and is held

in trust for the use and benefit of all the people.
One of the basic premises of the public trust doctrine
is that the sovereign acts as a trustee to protect and preserve
the public trust lands.

The Supreme Court has declared:

The Federal government holds all public lands
of the United States not as a monarch for private
or prP.rogative purposes, but as a trustee for the
benefit, use, and enjoyment of the sovereign
people of the United States.
Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536
Van Bracklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 158 (1885).
It has been argued that the concept of public trust imposes
three types of restrictions on governmental authority:
first, the property subject to the trust must not
only be used for a public purpose, but it must be
held available for use by the general public;
second, the property may not be sold, even for a
fair cash equivalent; and third, the property must
be maintained for particular types of uses. The
last claim is expressed in two ways. Either it is
urged that the resource must be held available for
certain traditional uses, such as navigation, recreation
or fishery, or it is said that the uses which are made
of the property must be in some sense related to the
natural uses peculiar to that resource. J. Sax,
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev.
477 (1969).
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The most famous public trust case is Illinois Central Railroad
Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 287

(1892).

At issue was the authority

of the state legislature to convey a fee simple title to the railroad of over one thousand acres of commercial waterfront to a
private railroad company.

The Supreme Court ruled that conveyance

of public trust lands was beyond the legislature's authority.

The

Court reasoned that a state has special regulatory obligations
over its shorelands and these obligations are inconsistent with
private ownership of the lands.
The Virginia Supreme Court discussed public trust lands
in a case involving the dumping by the City of Newport News of raw
sewage into the James and Hampton Roads.
The State holds its tidal waters and the lands
thereunder as a trustee for the benefit of all the
people of the State, to be administered as a trust
for the enjoyment by them of their public rights
therein, and subject to certain rights of user
thereof which are common to all the people of the
State.
This trust is an active, continuing trust;
and the trustee cannot be discharged or relieved
from the duty of actively and continuously
administering it and enforcing the corrunon rights
of the people therein 'unless by revision of our
Constitution'.

Va. 521, 533

Corrunonwealth v. NE~wport News, 158

(1932).

Assuming that the State of Virginia consented to the 1938
condemnation proceeding which established the Back Bay National
Wildlife Refuge, an argument can be advanced that all of the land
along the shores must remain in trust for the benefit of all
Virginians and thus are not subject to conveyance.
This theory of the public trust would in all probability
be subsumed by the potentially far-reaching effects of the eminent
domain theory.

If presented with such an argument, the court is
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likely to supercede any public trust arguments.
An argument based on custom would in all probability suffer a
similar fate.

There are numerous requirements for the

establishment of valid customary use.

Among these are the

necessities that customary uses be uninterupted
dispute.

and free from

Given the circumstances surrounding the Back Bay National

Wildlife Refuge, satisfying these two requirements may prove
difficult.
The primary weakness in making a custom argument is that
only one state, Oregon, appears to have recognized it as a
viable legal doctrine.
7.

State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254,462 P. 2d 671 (1969).

Implied Dedication

Other state courts have relied on the doctrine of implied
dedication to grant public recreational easements to dry sand
beaches.

See, Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923

(Tex. Civ. App. 1964) and Gian v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal.3d
29, 465 P.2d 50 (1962).

In Virginia, the State Supreme Court

will soon decide a case bearing on this doctrine.
In Bradford v. The Nature Conservancy (Va. Supreme Court Record
No. 79-1297), due for oral argument in the fall of 1981, the
State of Virginia has joined plaintiff Bradford as a coparty.

The

dispute concerns title to Hog Island, which lies off the Eastern
Shore of Virginia.

The Nature Conservancy acquired title to the

island several years ago and has since closed public access
through their property.

Specifically closed was a north-south

road or "highway" located in the inter-tidal area along the beach,
which had been used as a road for decades.

The state is asserting

a.claim to a substantial part of the beach property as a state commons
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pursuant to the Virginia commons statutes of 1873 and 1888
previously discussed in this report.
Judge Wahab in Northampton County Circuit Court decided
that the Atlantic Beach on Hog Island was subject to the public
right to use the intertidal strip as a roadway.

He observed that

the common law principles of dedication have been recognized and
applied in Virginia since 1871.

Bradford Opinion at 38.

Based

on his reading of Virginia law, the judge then addressed
the claims of the plaintiffs' concerning the Atlantic Beach of
Hog Island:
As the tide falls, the inter-tidal strip is left smooth
and compacted providing a suitable surface upon which
vehicles can travel at speeds comparable to those allowed
on highways. From the earliest days of the island's
history, the people have preferred the inter-tidal
strip for their route of travel north or south
when conditions permitted.
As the court has found, the title to this
strip remains in the Corrunonweal th of Virginia
where grants were made after April 1, 1873. Whatever title in the strip owners of land granted
prior to that time may have, their estate is
subservient to the public right to use the inter-

tidal strip as a roadway established by ancient
and continuous use. Where the strip is owned by
the Corcunonwealth, public use is subject to its
control.
Id. at 42.
However, even if the doctrine of implied dedication is a
viable argument in the Back Bay case, it may run counter to the
commons argument and is certainly counter to the position taken
by the Commonwealth in the Bradford v. Nature Conservancy appeals
to the Virginia Supreme Court.

The state has taken different sides
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on some of the issues determined by Judge Wahab in Bradford.

In

fact, the case pending before the Virginia Supreme Court is
actually two separate appeals which will be heard together before
the Virginia court.
In its opening brief in the case styled Commonwealth of Virginia
v. The Nature Conservancy and Bradford, Record No. 79-1320, the
state has taken the position that the trial court erred in holding
that the beaches at Hog Island had become a public roadway.
Brief of Appellant, p. 6.

The brief written by Assistant Attorney

General James E. Moore stated that:
The trial court seems to have concluded that
under 'principles of dedication or prescription
historic public use of the beaches for travel
created a public road . . . . This holding is
contrary to decisions of this Court which hold that
lands dedicated to one public use are not subject
to other public or private prescriptive right . • .
[Citations omitted].
The lower court's conclusion regarding the beach
roadway is also contrary to clearly established public
policy. The Acts of 1780, 1819 and 1873,
respectively, reveal unambiguous legislative intent to
preserve the shores for public fishing, fowling and
hunting. Declaring the Atlantic beaches a roadway
for vehicular travel seriously threatens the uses
for which the Atlantic beaches have been statutorily
reserved since 1780. Brief of Appellant, p. 6.
The reply brief of the Conunonwealth is equally unwaivering in
this position.

The brief states that public fishing, fowling

and hunting does not necessarily imply travel required to exercise
these public rights.

The state maintains the position that the

Commonwealth's right to regulate the purported roadway does not cure
the illegality of the purported roadway dedication.
of Appellants, p. 3.
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Reply Brief

In view of this position concerning public roadways on
Atlantic Beaches at Hog Island, the state may find it difficult
politically if not legally to adopt a position directly opposite
concerning the beaches at Back Bay.

If the state argues that t~

entire ocean strand is a conunons, the state may :Eind that its
own arguments in Commonwealth v. Bradford preclude it from arguing
that it is a public easement.

(See, the following discussion of

defenses.)
8.

Prescriptive Easement

A number of state courts have extended common law property
doctrines to enable the public to acquire easements to private
beach property.

Unfortunately, none have gone so far as to grant

prescriptive easements in state or federal lands.

The Supreme

Court of Florida recognized that prescriptive easements by the public
could be acquired through recreational uses in City of Daytona Beach
v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1974) and the Texas Supreme
Court in Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964) found that the requirements for a public prescriptive
easement had been satisfied.
These cases, while expanding the doctrine of prescriptive
easements, involve the acquisition of property belonging to private
parties.

Research has revealed no cases which extend this doctrine

of public prescriptive easements to property owned by the government.
25 Am. Jur.2d Easements and Licenses, § 41 states that:
In absence of an enabling statute an easement by
prescription cannot be acquired in property belonging to the United States or a State. Furthermore,
no prescriptive right can ordinarily be acquired
in property affected with a public interest or
dedicated to a public use.
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Virginia cases on this point are in accord.

Lynchburg v.

Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 170 Va. 108 (1938); Virginia Hot Springs
Co. v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 432 (1919); Bellenot v. City of Richmond,
108 Va. 314 (1908).
Following this line of cases it makes no difference whether
the state or the federal government owned the

property in question.

A prescriptive easement cannot be acquired in property owned by the
state or the federal government.
B.

DEFENSES

There are a number of defenses available to the Department of
Interior if the state brings suit under the theories discussed
above.
1.

Conflict of Law

The Constitution of the United States (Art. III,

§

2) provides

that any suit to which the United States is a party must be brought
in federal court.

One of the first issues that may arise in

fed~ral court is whether state or federal law should be applied
in a suit of this type.

This issue could have several facets.

The question may arise as to whether state or federal common law
rules should apply (e.g., in the areas of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, eminent domain, etc.).

The current approach to the choice-of-law question has its
basis in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

In that case,

the Supreme Court removed the power of the federal courts to declare
independent federal common law in deciding issues which would be
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governed by state law in state courts.
held that where the

However, later cases have

matter before the courts is closely related

to a federal function, state law does not govern of its own force
and the federal courts have the responsibility to fashion a federal
rule to decide the issue.

In the landmark case Clearfield Trust

Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) the court held that
unless Congress has specified otherwise, a federal court has the
option either to "adopt" state law as the content of the federal
rule or to develop uniform federal law to resolve the question.
In the Clearfield Trust case though, federal law was chosen as the
applicable federal rule to govern an action against the United States
on a federal check.
In determining whether to adopt state law as the content of
federal rule in the case before it, several prerequisites must
be present.

First the source of law applicable to the litigation

must be federal.

The source of applicable law is held to be

federal when the question at issue is substantially related to a
federal governmental function.

See, Comment, Adopting State Law

as the Federal .Rule of Decision:

823, 824 (1976).

A Proposed Test, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev.

More specifically, a federal source has been

found in cases involving activities stemming from a statute or
the Constitution (Clearfield Trust, supra.); in cases involving a
federal relationship (United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S.
301 (1947)}; and in cases arising out of a particular federal program
(United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.,412 U.S. 580 (1973)).
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The second prerequisite before reaching the adoption issue is
that Congress must not have determined the choice-of-law issue.
(See, e.g., Clearfield Trust, supra.)

Taken together, these two

prerequisites set the stage for the adoption choice by requiring
the court to fashion a federal rule while leaving them free to base
that rule on either federal or state law.
Applying the guidelines in Clearfield Trust and later cases to
the set of facts in the Back Bay controversy, it is likely that
the court will formulate a federal rule.

The dispute over Back

Bay appears to be closely related to a federal function and there
is no language in the Migratory Bird Conservation Act (16 U.S.C.

§ 715, et seq.) determining choice-of-law.

Thus, in attempting

to discern whether the court will be likely to adopt Virginia state
law as the federal rule, it should be helpful to focus on federal
cases similar to the Back Bay controversy.
In United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S.
580 (1973), the Court was presented with a case involving the
Migratory Bird Conservation Act.

As was the case with the Back Bay

National Wildlife Refuge, the United States acquired land parcels
in Louisiana for a wildlife refuge pursuant to that Act.

Mineral

rights were reserved for a period of ten years to the Little Lake
Misere Land Co.

(hereinafter Little Lake) who were former owners.

These rights were subject to extension if certain detailed exploration and production cbnditions were met.

Fee simple title was to

vest in the United States after either event.

The ten year period

expired without the extension conditions being met.

However,

Little Lake continued to claim the mineral rights, relying on a
Louisiana statute passed in 1940 after the refuge acquisition.
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The

statute, as applied retroactively, provided that mineral rights
reserved in land conveyances to the United States would continue
indefinitely.

The government brought suit to quiet title.

For the majority, Chief Justice Burger first acknowledged that
disputes over real property are generally governed by state law.
41 U.S. at 591-92.

But following the guidelines in Clearfield

Trust, he indicated that the source of law under these circumstances
must be federal:

" . . . [T]his land acquisition . . • is one

arising from and bearing heavily upon a federal regulatory
program.

Here, the choice-of-law task is a federal task for

federal courts, as defined by Clearfield Trust . • . . "

412 U.S.

at 592.
The federal regulatory program referred to in

Little Lake

is the National Wildlife Refuge System established in accordance
with the Migratory Bird Conservation Act.
Chief Justice Burger further noted that the Migratory Bird
Conservation Act is silent on the choice-of-law question, "[b]ut
silence on that score in federal legislation is no reason for
limiting the reach of federal law."

Id. at 593.

Once the Court

establishes that the source of law is to be federal, the question
becomes whether state law should be adopted as the federal rule.
Here, the Court found that the Louisiana statute was not an
appropriate standard for federal law:
The Court in the past has been careful to state that
even assuming in general terms the appropriateness
of 'borrowing' state law, specific aberrant or
hostile state rules do not provide appropriate standards
for federal law . . . .
To permit state abrogation of the explicit terms of a
federal land acquisition would deal a serious blow to
the congressional scheme contemplated by the Migratory
Bird Conservation Act and indeed all other federal
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land acquisition programs. These programs are national
in scope. . .
Certainty and finality are especially
critical when, as here, the federal officials carrying
out the mandate of Congress irrevocably commit
scarce funds.
Id. at 597.
Conceivably, the district court could ignore any Virginia
statute or common law rule it believed was aberrant or hostile
to the federal program at Back Bay based on this passage in Little
Lake.
However, the Little Lake

case can be distinguished by the fact

that the Louisiana statute in Little Lake was passed after the
federal land acquisition and also by the fact that the state had
no real interest in the outcome of the suit.

In Little Lake, the

government argued that virtually without qualification, land
acquisition agreements of the United States should be governed by
federally created federal law.
case in such broad terms.

The court declined to resolve the

In fact the Court states that,

"Conceivably our conclusion might be influenced if Louisiana's Act
as applied retroactively, served legitimate and important
state interests the fulfillment of which Congress might have
co~templated through application of state law."

Id. at 599.

Thus, the state can distinguish Little Lake by demonstrating
that not only did the Virginia commons statutes precede the federal
land acquisition at Back Bay, but a legitimate and important
purpose has been served historically and would be served presently
by a right-of-way through Back Bay.
In addition, the state can demonstrate that the courts have
traditionally deferred to state law in certain areas of the law.
For example, in United States v. Yazell., 382 U.S. 341. (1966),
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the Supreme Court held that state law has traditionally governed
in the field of family and family-property arrangements, and in
this case there was no reason to establish a federal rule.

State

law "should be overridden by the federal courts only where clear
and substantial interests of the National Government, which cannot
be served consistently with respect for such state interest, will
suffer major damage if the state law is applied."

Id. at 507.

A more recent example of deference to state law was in
Georgia Power Co. v. Sauders, 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980).

This

case arose out of a dispute over the amount of compensation for
property condemned by the utility company.

The Fifth Circuit held

that the source of the eminent domain power was clearly federal,
following the guidelines of Clearfield Trust.

As to whether state

law should be adopted as the federal rule the court stated that
"[b]asic considerations of federalism, as embodied in the Rules
of Decision Act, prompt us to begin with the premise that state
law should supply the federal rule unless there is an expression
of legislative intent to the contrary or, failing that, a showing
that state law conflicts significantly with any federal interests
or policies present in this case."

Id. at 1115-1116.

The

Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976) states that:
The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or
Act of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall
be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions
in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply.
The court in Georgia Power reviewed several Supreme Court
decisions and concluded that the cases evidence "a growing
desire to minimize displacement of state law."
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Id. at 1118.

Moreover, the court acknowledged that even though there were important
federal interests at stake in the suit, these interests were not
sufficient to warrant displacement of state law on the issue
of compensation in a private condemention proceeding.
The problem, however, with the Georgia Power case and other
recent decisions that adopt state law as the federal rule is that
the majority of these cases involved with the rights and claims of
private litigants.

In fact the Georgia Power court notes that

federal rules have been applied in federal condemnation cases
where the United States is the party condemning and paying for the
land.

Id. at 1119.

Research has revealed one other theory that may be advanced
to support the state's contention that state law should govern
the Back Bay dispute.

In 1977, the Supreme Court rules in

Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand

&

Gravel Co.,

429 U.S. 363 (1977), that disputed ownership of land underlying the
Willamette River was governed solely by state law and not federal
common law.

While this case was based primarily on an interpretation

of the equa~ footing doctrine, it may have precendentialvalue.
The Court in Corvallis based its ruling on an 1845 Supreme Court
decision, Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845).

Pollard's

Lessee held that the United States held land below the usual high
water mark in trust for the new states and under the equal-footing
doctrine each state as it joined the union enjoyed the absolute
right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under them for
their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered
by the Constitution.

The Court concluded that:
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First, The shores of navigable waters, and the
soils under them, were not granted by the
Constitution to the United States, but were
reserved to the states respectively . . . .
3 How. at 230. (Emphasis added).
The Corvallis court then recounts subsequent decisions consistent
with Pollard's Lessee.

For example in Weber v. Harbor Commr's.,

18 Wall. at 65-66, the Court held that ".

.

. absolute property

in, and dominion and sovereignty ove~ all soils under the tide
waters within her limits passed to the state . • • "of California.
And in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57-58

(11394) the Court stated:

"The title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the
soil below high water mark, therefore, are governed by the laws
of the several states, subject to the rights granted to the United
States by the Constitution."
Based on this line of cases, the Supreme Court chose to
overrule a decision decided the same year as Little Lake, supra.
In Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973) the Court
had treated the equal footing doctrine as a source of federal cominon
law and had applied federal rules to a disputed riverbed in Arizona.
However, the court in Corvallis stated:
This court has consistently held that state law
governs issues relating this property, like other
real property, unless some other principle of federal
law requires a different result.
Under our federal
system, property ownership is not governed by a
general federal law, but rather by the law of the
several states.
'The great body of law in this
country which controls acquisition, transmission, and
transfer of property, and defines the rights of its
owners in relation to the state or to private parties,
is found in the statutes and decisions of the states.'
Id. at 379 quoting Davis Warehouse Co. v. Bowles,
321 U.S. 144, 155 (1944).
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Even though the Corvallis decision is encouraging for the
state's position, there appears to be at least two problems.
First, the Court held that state law governs, unless some other
principle of federal law requires a different result.

That principle

arguably could be the one articulated in Little Lake.

The second

problem is stated in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (-1967).
In that case the Court held that a dispute over title to lands
owned by the federal government is governed by federal law:

"The

rule deals with waters that lap both the lands of the state and the
boundaries of the international sea.

This relationship, at this

particular point of the marginal sea, is too close to the vital
interest of the nation in its own boundaries to allow it to be
governed by any law but the "supreme law of the land!"

Id. at 293.

At this point it is mere supposition whether the court will follow
the rule as stated in Corvallis or as stated in Hughes.
2.

Res Judicata

In an effort to relitigate access through Back Bay National
Wildlife Refuge, the first hurdle will be the doctrine of res
judicata.

Under this doctrine, a valid, final judgment rendered

on the merits is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between
the same parties or those in privity when based upon the same
claim or demand.

lB Moore's Federal Practice§ 0.405[1]

(2d. ed.

198 0)
As stated in the U.S. Supreme Court:
The general rule of res judicata applies to
repetitious suits involving the-same cause of
action.
It rests upon considerations of
economy of judicial time and public policy favoring
the establishment of certainty in legal relations.
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The rule provides that when a court of competent
jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the
merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit
and their privies are thereafter bound 'not only as
to every matter which was offered and received to
sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to
any other admissible matter which might have been
offered for that purpose.' Cromwell v. County of
Sac., 94 U.S. 351, 352, 24 L. Ed. 195.
The judgment puts an end to the cause of action,
which cannot again be brought into litigation
between the parties upon any ground whatever, absent
fraud or some other factor invalidating judgment.
Com'r. v. Sunnen~ 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948).
Bearing this rule in mind, the Department of Interior has
already defended one attempt in court to re-open the beach at Back
Bay to motorized traffic.

Until the early 1970's the Refuge beach

was open to automobile traffic, but on March 30, 1973 regulations
severely curtailing beach traffic became effective.

Immediately

thereafter, a suit was filed seeking to keep the beach open.

One

bf the claims of the plaintiffs was that the Cnited States did not
own the beach between high and low water pursuant to the Virginia
commons statutes, and federal attempts to close the beach were
thus invalid.

The federal regulations were upheld and plaintiffs'

claims dismissed in Coupland v. Morton, 7 ERC 1965 {1975) and
affirmed by the Fourth Circuit,7 ERC 2127 (1975).
If the state attempts to bring any of the same causes
of action involving the commons statutes in the present action as
were heard in Coupland, the Department of Interior may attempt to
assert the doctrine of res judicata as a defense.

However, the

doctrine should not bar any future litigation by the state
involving the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge.
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On December 18, 1973, an interoffice memo was written at the
Virginia Institute.of Marine Science (VIMS) by Theodore Smolen,
an attorney who was conducting research on the Virginia commons
statutes for VIMS.

The memo indicated that the Commonwealth was

joined as a party defendant on December 7, 1973 in Coupland v. Morton,
~upra.

In the last paragraph of this memo, Smolen states that

"conversations with Mr. Baird (Assistant U.S. Attorney for Eastern
District of Virginia) indicated that the interests of the United
States and the Commonwealth in this matter were identical.
I do not know if this is still the case.

However,

There seems to be no

apparent ground for conflict between these parties in the matter."
(Emphasis added).
If Smolen's statement.is correct -- that the interests of
the United States and the Commonwealth were identical or there
was no conflict between the parties -- then res judicata should not
be a bar to litigation on the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge
between the United States and the Commonwealth.
In researching the res judicata issue, a preliminary matter
will be the question of conflict of law:

whether the Virginia

or Federal rules will apply which has been discussed in a
preceeding section.
As noted in Coupland v. Morton, supra_, the Commonwealth was
joined as a co-defendant with the United States.

In the event

of future litigation Virginia would be the plaintiff.
situation the black letter rule is well established:

In this
Parties to

an action are not bound by a judgment, in a subsequent controversy
with each other, unless they were adversary parties in the original
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suit.

Dobbins v. Barnes, 204 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1953);

Livesay Industries, Inc. v. Livesay Window Co.·' 2 0 2 F. wd 3 7 8
(5th Cir. 1953); Fidelity and Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Federal Express,
136 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1943); Byrum v. Ames

&

Webb, Inc., 196 Va.

597, 85 S.E. 2d 364 (1955); Natl. Bondholders Corp. v. Seaboard
Citizens Natl. Bank of Norfolk, 110 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1940).

SO C.J.S. Judgments§ 819 summarizes the rule as follows:
"Estoppel . . . is raised only between those who were adverse
parties in the former suit and the judgment therein originally settles
nothing as to the relative rights or liabilities of the co-plaintiffs
or co-defendants inter sese, unless their hostile or conflicting
claims were actually brought in issue,

litigated and determined

as by being put in issue by cross petition or separate and adverse
answers or unless, under statute, the co-parties occupy adversary
positions."
In light of the general rule stated above, it would appear
that the rule of res judicata does not apply to the present Back
Bay action.

However, the Fourth Circuit case, Nat'l. Bondholders

Corp., supra, indicates that there are several exceptions to the
general rule.

They are:

" • • . where co-parties do in fact

occupy the attitude of adversaries . . . or where some finding of
fact is made in the first suit which is an essential element in a
claim or action subsequently brought by one against the other."
110 F.2d 138, 144.
From the facts as established, it does not appear that the United
States and the Commonwealth could be termed adversaries in
Coupland v. Morton, supra.

"The test is whether they make each other
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adversaries by raising issues among themselves.

If they do

they are bound by the findings of the jury or the Court

II

Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 204 F. Supp.
757,759

(N.D. Tenn. 1967).

Turning to the Virginia rule in Byrum v. Aines

&

Webb, Inc.,

supra, the Virginia Supreme Court appears to be unmoved by the
res judicata argument.

In a prior case, the co-defendants had

tried to show the other liable for damages.

But the court said:

"No issue was presented to the court for adjudication as between
the two defendants.

The evidence each offered in that suit was

for the purpose of having adjudicated an issue between themselves."
The court approved the rule stated in the Restatement of Judgments

§ 82 (1942): "the rendition of a judgment in an action does not
conclude parties to· the action who are not adversaries under
the pleadings as to their right inter se upon matters which they
did not litigate, or have an opportunity to litigate, between
themselves."

See also, Fowler v. Ainerican Federation of Tobacco

Growers, Inc., 195 Va. 770, 80 S.E.2d 554 (1954).
In sum, it is probable that the Commonwealth will not be barred
from relitigating the Back Bay dispute based on the doctrine of
res judicata.
3.

Collateral Estoppel

A defense that is part of the doctrine of res judicata is that
of collateral estoppel.

Under the doctrine of res judic~ta a

judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties
or their privies bars a second suit based on the sane cause of action.
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel such a judgment precludes
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relitigation of issues actually litigated and determined in the
prior suit, regardless of whether it was based on the same cause
of action as the second suit.
Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955).

Lawlor v. National Screen Service
A more recent statement of the rule

is that "once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction that determination is conclusive
in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving
a party to the prior litigation."

Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.

147, 153 (1979).
Thus, not only might the government attempt to collaterally
estop the state from relitigating any issues determined in
Coupland v. Morton, supra, but it could also a.ssert collateral
estoppel as a defense based on Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, supra,
if the Virginia Supreme Court's ruling is adverse to the state.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,should be an
inappropriate defense concerning the issues litigated in Coupland v.
Morton, supra.

Since collateral estoppel is a part of the doctrine

of res judicata, the same principles concerning coparties should
apply:
Estoppel . . . is raised only between those who
are adverse parties in the former suit and the
judgment therein ordinarily settles nothing as to the
relative rights or liabilities of the co-plaintiffs
or codefendants inter sese, unless their hostile
or conflicting claims were actually brought in issue,
litigated and determined by being put in issue
by cross petition or separate and adverse answers or
unless, under statute, the coparties occupy adversary
positions. SO C.J.S. Judgments§ 819.
It should be noted that collateral estoppel is usually asserted
when a party has litigated and lost and seeks to relitigate that
issue.

In the Coupland case, the state was joined as a defendant
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with the Department of Interior and essentially won all issues.
The state has not previously lost but could potentially change
positions.

(See, the section on doctrine of preclusion against

inconsistent positions, infra.)
Turning to the Bradford case, the question will be whether
the government, who was not a party in that action, can
collaterally estop the state from reasserting the commons issues
if the ruling in the Virginia Supreme Court goes against the state.
In the landmark case of Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court examined the scope of the
doctrine.

The court observed that collateral estoppel, like the

related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting
litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with
the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by
preventing needless litigation.

Id. at 326.

The traditional rule

was that the scope of collateral estoppel was limited by the doctrine
of mutuality of parties.

That is, the determination was not

conclusive if the second action involved different parties, even
though one of them had been a party to the first action and had
unsuccessfully litigated the issue on that occasion.

The rule was

stated in Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912):
"It is a principle of general elementary law that estoppel of a
judgment must be mutual."

This principle was based on the premise

that it is somehow unfair to allow a party to use a prior judgment
when he himself would not be so bound.

Thus, the mutuality require-

ment allowed a party who had litigated and lost in a previous action
an opportunity to relitigate identical issues with new parties.
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. The rule was subject to many exceptions, but it remained
universally recognized until 1942, when it was repudiated by the
California Supreme Court in Bernhard v. Bank o:E America, 19 Cal.2d
807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).

In an opinion written by Justice Traynor,

the court said:
In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata
(collateral estoppel) three questions are pertinent:
was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
identical with the one presented in the action in
question? Was there a final judgment on the merits?
Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a
party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication?" 19 Cal.2d at 809-810, 122 P.2d at 893.
Bernhard gradually gained adherence from other courts, and in 1971,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University
of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971) abandoned the mutuality
requirement, at least in cases where a patentee seeks to relitigate
the validity of a patent after a federal court in a previous lawsuit
has already declared it invalid.

Under the influence of that

decision, the Bernhard rule has gained wider acceptance and has
now been adopted in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments§ 88

(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975).
The Blonder-Tongue and Bernhard cases both involved the
defensive use of collateral estoppel -- a plaintiff was estopped
from asserting a claim that he had previously litigated and lost
against another defendant.
If there was any question about the scope of the Court's
ruling in Blonder-Tongue, or about the Court's attitude toward the
mutuality rule, it was resolved in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322 (1979).

There the court granted federal courts
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broad discretion in determining when the use of offensive
collateral estoppel should be applied.

In other words, in certain

circumstances a defendant who has been sued and lost on a certain
issue can be estopped from defending against another plaintiff on
the identical issue (e.g., on the issue of negligence in a
related series of tort cases).
Thus, if the court applies the federal rule, it is conceivable
that the Department of Interior could estop the state from
relitigating claims based solely on the commons statutes if the
ruling in Bradford goes against the state.

However, if the court

chooses to adopt the state rule on collateral estoppel, the

trial judge might not allow the defensive use of collateral estoppel.
As recently as November 26, 1980, the Virginia Supreme Court
addressed the issue of collateral estoppel without mutuality.
Norfolk

&

In

Western Ry. Co. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 272 S.E.2d 217 (1980),

the court noted the modern trend to abrogate the mutuality requirement, but concluded not to abandon the mutuality rule when "offensive
use of collateral estoppel is sought to be invoked in one of a
series of damage suits arising from a common disaster."
By way of explanation the court stated that:

Id. at 220.

In Virginia, the

established rule is that collateral estoppel requires mutuality
especially when the estoppel is used offensively."

•

•

•

Id. at 219.

This explanation leaves the court's position on defensive collateral
estoppel somewhat unclear; however, the tenor of the opinion suggests
that the court may be reluctant to abandon the mutuality requirement
in virtually any case.

The court merely defines collateral estoppel

and cites ferebee v. Hungate, 192 Va. 32, 63 S.E.2d (1951) as

80

I

reference.

There the court stated unequivocally that:

"Judgements

and decrees are conclusive evidence of facts only as between
parties and privies to the litigation.

And, in the case of a

former adjudication set up on defense, it is no bar unless the
parties to the first judgment are the same as those to the
second proceeding."

Id. at 63 S.E.2d 764.

Thus if the Virginia

Supreme Court's position is still grounded on Ferebee it appears
that the mutuality requirement is still in place in Virginia.
Even if the district court chooses to apply the federal rule
on collateral estoppel the doctrine may still be inapplicable to
a case involving state ownership in Back Bay.

Before collateral

estoppel can be invoked several conditions must be satisfied .
..

First, the issue to be relitigated must be essentially the same
as Lhe issue litigated in the previous action.

Second, this issue

must have been actually litigated in the prior action.

Third, there

must have been a determination in the first action precisely on
this issue.

Fourth, this determination must have been necessary

to the judgment in the earlier action.

See geinerally, Montana v.

United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-157 (1979); F'. James, Civil
Procedure§ 11.16-31 (2d ed. 1977); lB Moore's Federal Practice
,1,1 0. 4 41-. 4 4 8 ( 2d ed. 19 8 0) •

Determination of these conditions must await a decision in Bradford,
but certainly the state can show that the disputes at Hog Island
and at Back Bay are distinct geographically and legally.

The Court

in Montana stated that it must be shown that the "question expressly
and definitely presented in this suit is the same as that definitely
and actually litigated and adjudged'' in the prior litigation before
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collateral estoppel can be invoked.
U.S. at 157.

Montana v. United States, 440

And in Alderman v. Chrysler Corp., 480 F. Supp. 600

(E .. D. Va. 1979); Judge Warriner for the Richmond Division stated
that, "The'infallable' test of whether a second action involves
the same cause of action as a prior suit is whether the facts
essential to sustain the two suits are the same."

Id. at 607.

Moreover, the purpose of collateral estoppel (judicial
economy and preventing _needless litigation) would not be served
in this case because it would have been inappropriate to join the
Department of Interior in the Bradford case.
In addition, it can be argued that collateral estoppel in this
situation is inappropriate because the doctrine should be limited

to questions of fact or mixed law/fact.

Many of the theories and

issues pertinent to the state's interests in Back Bay are questions
of law, and prior determinations of law have primarily precedential
value.

In Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162 (1979)

the Court cited United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924)
for the proposition that:
Where, for example, a court in deciding a case has
enunciated a rule of law, the parties in a
subsequent action upon a different demand are not
estopped from insisting that the law is otherwise,
merely because the parties are the same in both cases.
But a fact, question, or right distinctly adjudged
in the original action cannot be disputed in a
subsequent action, even though the determination
was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous
application of the law.
(Emphasis added).
The Court in Montana concluded that when issues of law
arise in successive actions involving unrelated subject matter,
preclusion may be inappropriate.

440 U.S. at 162.

This is the

position taken by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments§ 68.1
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{Tert. Draft No. 4, 1977), and it is also the view of the Virginia
Sunrcrne Court as expressed in Bates v. Devers,

S.E.2d 917 (1974):

214 Va. 667, 202

"Collateral estoppel is the preclusive effect

impacting in a subsequent action based upon a collateral and
different cause of action.

In the subsequent action, the parties

to the first action and their privies are precluded from litigating
any issue of fact actually litigated and essential to a valid and
final personal judgment in the first action."
(Emphasis added).
Restatement Supp.

Id. at 671

Citing the Restatement of Judgments§ 70 (1942)
(Judgments§ 70 (1948), the court noted that

collateral estoppel is applied with less rigor to issues of law.

Id.

The defense of collateral estoppel may be available to the
federal government if the Bradford case is determined adversely to
the state's interests, and especially if the court elects to follow
the federal rule as enunciated in Blonder-Tongue.

The state

rule on the defensive use of collateral estoppel is less clear, but
the Nor£olk and Western case appears to indicate that the rule of
mutuality is still in effect in Virginia.

It is a matter of

conjecture how a federal court would interpret the Virginia rule.
However, even if the mutuality rule is abandoned in the Back Bay

case, the state can argue with authority that collateral estoppel
is inappropriate in this case, because not only are the facts
in Back Bay and Bradford quite different, but the Back Bay controversy
involves questions of law which should preclude collateral estoppel.
4.

The Attorney General's Letter (Equitable Estoppel)

In a letter addressed to the City of Virginia Beach dated
October 18, 1971, the Attorney General of Virginia disclaimed any
interest of the state in the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge.
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In a suit by the state, the federal government may attempt
to estop the state from asserting interest in the ~efuge based
on the Attorney General's disclaimer.

It does not appear, however,

that it would preclude the state from asserting its interest in the
Refuge.
Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel a party may prevent
another from changing position to the former's detriment.

However,

before the government can avail itself of this doctrine several
prerequisites must be met.

Pomeroy defines equitable estoppel as:

. . . the effect of the voluntary conduct of a
party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at
law and in equity, from asserting rights which might
perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property,
of contract, or of remedy, as against another person,
who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and
has been led ·thereby to change his position for the

worse, and who on his part acquires some corresponding
right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy.
3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 3804 (5th ed. 1941).
In§ 805 Pomeroy lists six: essential elements and requisites
in forming a defense of equitable estoppel.

Among these, Pomeroy

indicated that the conduct of the estopped party must be relied upon
by the other party, and the relying party must in fact act upon the
conduct in such a manner as to change his position for the worse.
In other words, the party asserting the doctrine must rely on the
conduct to his detriment.
From all indications, it appears that the Department of Interior
has not changed its position in any manner since the Attorney
General's letter was written.

Therefore, it appears well settled

that the federal government could not estop the state on this
basis.

The government would have the burden to prove that it had

changed its position so as to be injured by the state's conduct.
See, Thomasson v. Walker, 168 Va. 247 (1937) for a statement of the
rule.
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Even if the government could show detrimental reliance, the rule
in Virginia is that the state is not subject to the laws of estoppel
when acting in a governmental capacity.
Estoppel § 6 (1976).

7 Michie's Jurisprudence,

This rule was stated by the Virginia Supreme

Court in Main v. Department of Highways, 2u6 Va .. 143, 142 S.E.2d
524 (1965).

"

.

[I]t is well settled that the doctrine of

estoppel does not apply to the rights of a state when acting
in its sovereign or governmental capacity.

This is so because the

legislature alone has the authority to dispose of or dispense with
such rights."

142 S.E.2d at 529.

Noting that the Main case is still the rule in Virginia, the
court in Commonwealth ex reL Attorney General of Virginia v.
Washington Gas__ Light Co., 269 S.E. 2d 820 (1980) acknowledged that
the state's view on the doctrine may be a minority view and the recent
trend appears to be to the contrary.

The court agreed in theory

to allow application of the doctrine in this particular case (the
issue involved a revenue ruling issued by the State Corporation
Commission).

However, the court held that the party asserting

estoppel could not prove by clear and unequivocal evidence that
there was reliance on the state's representations.
The federal rule on estoppel against the government (state,
local or federal) is somewhat unclear.

Without developing the

case history of the federal rule, it should suffice to note that
as recently as April 6, 1981, the Supreme Court addressed the
estoppel issue.

In Schweiker v. Hannen,

U.S.

, 101 S.Ct.

1468 (1981), the Court held that the Social Security Administration
(SSA) could not be estopped from insisting upon compliance with a
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valid regulation even though a field representative of the SSA
had given erroneous information to a claimant regarding the
regulation.

In his dissent, Justice Marshall pointed out that

the majority suggests that estoppel may be justified in some
circumstances, yet, there are no indications where those
circumstances are.

The majority simply concludes in Schweiker

that estoppel is not justified in this case.
Certainly, the trend in both federal and state courts is toward
relaxing the rigid rule of no estoppel against the government.
See generally, K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies

§ 17.01 et seq.

(1976); Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Government,

79 Colum. L. Rev. 551 (1979).

Professor Davis argues that

estoppel should be applied against governmental bodies "where justice
and right require it" and observes that it is nowessentially the law.
Davis, supra,§ 17.02.
Regardless of wheth~r the district court turns to federal or
state law, it seems likely that the federal government will not be
able to estop the state based on the Attorney General's disclaimer.
The federal government should be hard pressed to show detrimental
reliance on the Attorney General's letter or that justice and right
require estoppel.

If the Supreme Court is still hesitant to apply

estoppel to a federal agency where there was apparent reliance on
governmental advice, as in Schweiker, the district court should
refuse to estop the state where these was no reliance.
5.

Doctrine of Preclusion Against Inconsistent Positions

Even where the facts will not permit the application of
res judicata or collateral estoppel, it is recognized that a party
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who has assumed a particular position in judicial proceedings
may be estopped to assume a position inconsistent to the prior
position if it is to the prejudice of the adverse party. 31 C.J.S.,
Estoppel § 117; 28 Am. Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver§ 68.

This

doctrine of preclusion against inconsistent positions is
sometimes referred to as "judicial estoppel" and has frequently
been recognized as a doctrine forbidding inconsistent positions,
usually as to facts.

Scarano v. Central R. Co., 203 F.2d 510

(3rd Cir. 1953); Thrasher v. Thrasher, 210 Va. 624, 172 S.E.2d 771.
(1974).

Accordingly, it has frequently been stated that where a

party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and
succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter assume
a position to the contrary simply because his interests have
changed.

31 C.J. S., Estoppel § 117.

Since in Coupland v. Morton the state took the position that
it had no interest in the property in dispute at Back Bay, the
government in subsequent litigation involving Back Bay might
assert that this doctrine bars the state from now claiming an
interest in the Back Bay property.

However, this doctrine or rule

of estoppel is subject to a number of limitations or exceptions.
First of all, the rule against self-contradiction is said to
rest on the policy of preserving the sanctity of oath, the orderly
administration of justice and a regard for the dignity of judicial
proceedings.

lB Moore's Federal Practice, 0.405[8]

(2d ed. 1980).

The rationale for the doctrine seems to be based on a judicial
reluctance to allow litigants to "play fast and loose" with the
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courts according to the vicissitudes of self-interest.
Central R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3rd Cir. 1953).

Scarano v.

In other words,

the doctrine is based on the idea that a party should not be
allowed to argue one set of facts to serve his interest and
then to argue another set when his interest has changed.
Accordingly, the doctrine may not be invoked where the position
first assumed was taken as a result of ignorance or mistake, or
through the fault _of the party claiming estoppel.

31 C.J.S.

Estoppel § 117, lB Moore's Federal Practice, § 0.045[8]

(2d ed.

1980).
Also, the basis for this doctrine has reference only to
factual matters and not to contentions upon the law as applied
to a given set of facts.
(1976).

7 Michie's Jurisprudence, Estoppel

§

34

It has generally been accepted that the doctrine against

prior inconsistent positions does not apply where the prior
statement was merely an expression of opinion or legal conclusion.
Sturm v. Baker, 150 U.S. 312 (1893}; Hartford Fire Inc. Co. v.
Carter, 196 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1952}; U.S. v. Siegel, 472 F. Supp.

440 (N.D. Ill. 1979); 7 Michie's Jurisprudence, Estoppel § 34 (1976);
28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver§ 71.

Thus, a person who has

taken an erroneous position on a question of law is ordinarily not
estopped from later taking the correct position, provided his
adversary has suffered no harm or prejudice by reason of the change,
7 Michie's Jurisprudence, Estoppel § 34

(1976).

Certainly, the Attorney General's letter disclaiming any
state interest in Back Bay was a legal opinion, which was the basis
for the state's position in Coupland v. Morton, supr~, along with
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the complex legal questions of state consent and state commons.
Since the Department of Interior has in no way changed its position,
it could show no harm or prejudice by reason of the change.

There~

fore, the state should be able to demonstrate adequately that the
doctrine against inconsistent statements is inapplicable in this
case:

the state is not changing the facts to suit its purposes,

but has re-evaluated a complex set of legal theories and has
discovered a state interest in land where before none was
thought to exist.

If this were not enough, there are several other limitations
which should bar the use of this doctrine:

1) the principal of

preclusion is not usually applied against the state or federal
government.

Note, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1132, 1136 (1946); 31 C.J.S.

Estoppel, § 117; 2) the doctrine does not apply to a prior
proceeding in which the parties are not the same;

the Pittson Co.

v. O'Hara, 191 Va. 886, 63 S.E.2d 34 (1951); Ferebee v. Hungate,
192 Va. 32, 63 S.E.2d 761 (1951); and the same questions must be
involved.

In re Johnson, 518 F.2d 246, 252 (10th Cir. 1975) cert.

den. 423 U.S. 893; Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum,
99 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1938) cert. den. 305 U.S. 659; 3) the party

invoking the estoppel must have relied on the first position, and
so relying, have acted, or refrained from acting or have changed
his position to his prejudice. 31 C.J.S. § 117 Estoppel; 4) there
can be no estoppel based on such reliance where the party invoking
it had knowledge equal or superior to that possessed by his
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adversary and sufficient to protedl: him against being misled or
relying on where he had a sufficient opportunity to acquire such
knowledge.

31 C.J.S. § 117 Estoppel; 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and

Waiver§ 70.
These limitations should be satisfactory to render the doctrine
of preclusion against inconsistent statements inapplicable.

A

district court in U.S. v. Siegel, 472 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill 1979)
commented that: "The scope of judicial estoppel is narrow,
particularly when applied to the Government, and generally, it
pertains to statements made under oath in judicial proceedings and
does not apply where the prior statement is merely an expression
of opinion or legal conclusion."

6.

Jurisdiction - Statute of Limitations

a)

28 U.S.C. § 1331 - Federal Question, now provides:
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy . . . arises under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,
except that no . . • · sum or value shall be required
in any action brought against the United States, any
agency thereof, or any officer thereof in his official
capacity.

It appears that under one or more of the state's claims above,
jurisdiction would be conferred by§ 1331.

In at least one

decision the United States Supreme Court has stated that
"jurisdiction in this action to review a decision of the Secretary
of Interior is clearly conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 133l{a).

Andrus

v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604 at 609 (1978).
b)

28 U.S.C.

§ 1346(a) (2) - The Tucker Act

Under any claim for money damages not sounding in tort, the
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state must seek jurisdiction under this statute, which represents
Congressional consent for such actions.

The ~rucker Act confers

on the district courts:
Any other civil action or claim against the
United States not exceeding $10,000 in amount,
founded either upon the Constitution, or any
Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive
department, or upon any express or implied contract
with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages not sounding in tort.
The jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Claims.
The purpose of the subsection is to permit a person with a
relatively small claim against the United States to bring his
action in the district of his residence rather than having to
pursue it in Washington in the Court of Claims.

Those with claims

more than $10,000 must proceed in the Court of Claims.
Actions founded upon the Constitution, which have been held to
be within the Tucker Act jurisdiction include actions for
unconstitutional taking of property.

Section 1346(a) (2) applies

to inverse condemnation suits by landowners.

United States v. 21.54

Acres of Land, 491 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Wald,

330 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1964).
The primary problem in using either 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) or

§ 1346(a) (2) is the statute of limitations provided in 28 U.S.C.
§

2401;

(and in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 for the Court of Claims).
Every civil action conunenced against the United
States shall be barred unless the complaint is
filed within six years after the right of action
first accrues . . . .

This general statute of limitations could be problematic
because it is jurisdictional and may not be waived by the federal

91

goverruJlent, Crown Coat Front Co. vr~\United States, 275 F. Supp.
10 (S.D. N.Y. 1967); and it is well settled that the statute is
applicable to a claim by a state, California v. United States,
132 F. Supp. 208 (C. Cl. 1955).
In cases involving eminent domain, the claim accrues when the
United States first takes possession of the land or files a
declaration of taking, whichever is first.

United States v.

422,978 Sq. Ft. of Land in San Francisco, 445 F.2d 1180 (9th
Cir. 1971).

Since the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge was

condemned in 1938, and access through the Refuge was closed in the
early 1970's the statute under 28

u.s.c.

§§

2401(a), 2501 has run.

However, the statute of limitations may be tolled.

The

federal courts have in some instances postponed the commencement
of the statute where the claimant "did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable diligence could not learn that he had been
injured by the government's allegedly wrongful conduct."
States v. Sams, 521 F.2d 421, 429 (3rd Cir. 1975).
of the Court of Claims appears to be tougher:

United

The standard

The plaintiff must

either show that the defendant has "concealed its acts with the
result that plaintiff was unaware of their existence or [plaintiff]
must show that its injury was 'inherently unknowable' at the
accrual date.

Japanese War Notes Claimants Ass'n. v. United States,

373 F.2d 356, 359, cert. den. 389 U.S. 971 (C. Cl. 1967).
c)

28 U.S.C.

§

1346(b) - Federal Tort Claims Act

Under a theory of negligence, jurisdiction will be founded on
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
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Under this section the

United States has waived its inununity from tort liability and
district courts are given exclusive jurisdiction of claims
against the United States for money damages, for injury or
loss of property, or personal injury or death, caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the United
States while acting within the scope of his employment.
The FTCA has been interpreted as only waiving inununity for
negligence.

Intentional torts (other than by law enforcement

officials) are not seen as being within the scope of employment.
Vigil v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 1176 (D.C. Col. 1968);
United States v. Drinkwater, 434 F. Supp. 457

(E:.D. Va. 1977).

The FTCA presents a problem of limited retroactivity.
That is, the United States has only waived immunity for claims
accruing on and after January 1, 1945.

This would, at first, appear

to eliminate any claim arising from the 1937-38 title searches.
This section, however, has been interpreted as a.llowing claims for
injuries suffered after 1945 which resulted from pre-1945
negligence.
931

In re:

Silver Bridge Disaster Litigation, 381 F. Supp.

(S.D. W. Va. 1974).

The task for the state, therefore, is to

, show that injury did not occur until its claim was discovered after
1945.
The second major obstacle presented by the FTCA is a two year
statute of limitations.

A tort claim against the United States

is barred unless it is presented to the appropriate agency within
two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun
within six months after final denial of the claim from that
agency.

28 U.S.C. § 240l(b).

The important point here is the

date of accrual of the state's claim.
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The Fourth Citcuit has announced~that a claim does not accrue
until a claimant has had a "reasonable opportunity to discover all
of the essential elements of a possible cause of action - duty,
breach, causation, damages.

II

Bridgeford v. United States,

550 F.2d 978, 981 (4th Cir. 1977).
The United States Supreme Court has since questioned the
requirement that the plaintiff must know that the injury was
negligently inflicted before a claim accrues.

They affirm, however,

that he must at least know of the facts of his injury to begin
the running of the statute.
111

(1979).

United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S.

Since the state did not even know of the facts of

its injury until just recently, the two-year period should just
now have begun to run.
The state's argument will be based on the theory that the
United States had a duty to find all persons who might have had
an interest in the condemned land.

The federal government attempted

to meet this duty through a title search.

The breach of that

duty occurred in that the federal government (or its agents) did
not perform the search with reasonable care.

Evidence is

available in the interpretation of the United States map of the
"Princess Anne Club Tracts~ which shows the Dawley and Malbone, et al.
grants in the wrong location.

See discussion in this report,

Section II~ C supra.
d)

28 U.S.C. § 1346(f) - United States as Defendant,provides

that: "The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
of civil actions under§ 2409(a) to quiet title to an estate in
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real property in which an interest is claimed by the United
States."

This section, added in 1972, grants jurisdiction for

an action to quiet title to land in which the United States has
an interest.
28

u.s.c.

§

2409(a) waives sovereign immunity and allows

the United States to be named a party defendant in a civil action
to adjudicate a disputed title to land in which the United States
claims an interest.
Under§ 2409(a) a complaint is insufficient and will be
dismissed unless it states with particularity the nature of
plaintiff's right, title or interest, circumstances under which
land was acquired, right, title or interest claimed by the
United States, and the date on which the plaintiffs or their
predecessors in interest knew or should have known of claims of
the United States.
(D.C. Cal. 1974),

Buchler v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 709
(See§ 2409a(c)).

This section also contains a statute of limitations provision.

§ 2409a(f) provides that:
Any civil action under this section shall be
barred unless it is commenced within 12 years of the
date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be
deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or
his predecessor in interest knew or should have·
known of the claim of the United States.
In Gross v. Andrus, 556 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1977), which was
a suit against the Department of Interior to quiet title in
certain Indian lands, the court held that the 12-year statute of
limitations does not begin to run from the date the statute was
enacted, but from the time when the claim of the United States
became known or should have become known.

This may become a major

hurdle in disputing title to property at Back Bay since the interest
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.

of the United States became known i~:1938 when the land was acquired.
Questioning title to a right-of-way or to an area below high tide
mark may be another question since the Refuge was not closed to
traffic until 1972.

At any rate, language in another opinion

states that statutes which waive inununity of the United States from
suit are to be construed strictly in favor of sovereign and claims
are barred under§ 2409a where ownership claimed by the United
States was well known.

Hart v. United States, 585 F.2d 1280

(5th Cir. 1978).
Note also, that§ 2409a(b) apparently allows the United States
to condemn any property if final determination under§ 2409a is adverse to the United States:
. . the United States nevertheless may retain
such possession or control of the real property
or of any part thereof as it may elect, upon
payment to the person determined to be entitled
thereto of an amount which upon such election
the district court in the same action shall
determine to be just compensation for such
possession or control.
Thus, even if the Cormnonwealth won the case, apparently the
property could be recondemned under this statute.
§ 125l(b) Original Jurisdiction provides that:
The Supreme Court shall have original but not
exclusive jurisdiction of:
(2) All controversies between the United States and
state;
This statute provides the opportunity to invoke the original
jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court.

Caveat:

a suit

which need not be brought originally in Supreme Court can be
removed to federal court.

•

Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884).
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But Cf. California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 63 (1979)

(California

sought to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in
suit to quiet title against Arizona and the United States).
7.

Laches

The doctrine of laches cannot be applied against public
rights.

30A C.J.S. Equity,

§

114.

By weight of authority the

defense of laches is not available against the government, state
or national, in a suit by it to enforce a public right or to
protect a public interest.

U.S. v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 67

S.Ct. 1658 (1947); U.S. v. Summerlin, Fla., 310 U.S. 414, 60 S.Ct.
1019 (1940); U.S. v. Ruby, 558 F.2d 697, 705 (9th Cir. 1978).
8.

Adverse Possession

The federal government could attempt to use the doctrine of
adverse possession in two ways.

The first assertion could involve

previous owners of tracts which now comprise the Back Bay National
Wildlife Refuge.

Title searches have revealed several tracts of

land which were mysteriously expanded as they passed through the
chain of title.
lands.

This expansion results in an Emcroachment on state

When this evidence is presented it is probable that the

federal government will attempt to show that title to state lands
as

acquired through adverse possession by thE? individual private

landowners, and hence good title has passed to the United States.
a)

Adverse Possession by Individuals in Virginia.

The general rule in Virginia is that there can be no adverse
possession of land against the Commonwealth, and no time will bar
her recovery.

lA Michie's Jurisprudence, Adverse Possession§ 49
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(1980).

However, ~s early as 1798 th~~legislature created an
.. I•

exception to this rule.·

As the Virginia Supreme Court observed

in Seekright v. Lawson, 35 Va.

(8 Leigh) 458, 462 (1836):

No time runs against the commonwealth, unless
where the legislature has thought proper to
allow.it.
By the act of 1798 it is enacted that
where lands have been settled for thirty years, and
the taxes have been paid thereon within that
period no entry or location thereon shall be valid,
and the comrnonwealth's right to such lands is
thereby relinquished.
This Act (Sess. Acts of 1797-8, Ch. 10 § 1) has remained
a continuous part of the Code of Virginia, and today can be
found at§ 41.1-8 of the Code.

The provision which required

continuous settlement and payment of taxes for 30 years has
gradually been reduced until at present the requirement is only
five years.
However, despite meeting the continuous settlement requirement,
the claimant may still not be able to support a claim of title by
adverse possession against the state in an area such as Back Bay.
The 1798 Act required that lands be "settled" for thirty years before the Comrnonwealth relinquished its interests.

It is unclear

what the General Assembly meant by "settled", but a strong
argument can be made that this entailed residential occupancy or
cultivation of the land and not merely use for recreational purposes
such as hunting or fowling.
The requirements for adverse possession are that it must
be actual, exclusive, hostile, open and notorious for the statutory
period.

lA.Michie's Jurisprudence, Adverse Possession§ 3 (1980) .

.While the requirements for actual possession vary with the
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situation of the land and the condition of the country, the
typical mode of actual possession is by occupancy, residency,
cultivation, enclosure or improvement.
Adverse Possession, § 5 (1980).

lA Michie's Jurisprudence,

Therefore, if the meaning of

"settled" in§ 41.1-8 is to be interpreted to be in consonance with
the actual possession requirement, it can be argued that some
showing of use other than recreational will be necessary.
Therefore, the concept of settlement may encompass more than
merely fishing and hunting activities by hunt clubs or
individuals.
Assuming that statutory requirements are met, a claim of
title to land by adverse possession may still be inapplicable to
lands within the Refuge.

It appears that where wild and uncultivated

land is involved an additional element may be required to claim
title by adverse possession.

In Taylor v. Burnsides, 42 Va.

(1 Gratt.)

166, 202 (1844), it was stated that "wild and uncultivated lands,
completely in a state of nature, are not susceptible [to adverse
possession].

An adversary possession of them can only be acquired

by acts producing a change in their condition."

This rule was

followed in Harman v. Ratcliff, 93 Va. 249, 24 S.E. 1023 (1896)
and in Austin v. Minor, 107 Va. 101, 57 S.E. 609 (1907) and in
Leake v. Richardson, 199 Va. 967, 103 S.E.2d 227 (1958).

In Leake

the court stated:
The character of the acts necessary to vest one with
a title by adverse possession varies with the nature
of the property involved, or in a state of nature,
. . . the acts of ownership must indicate a change of
condition, showing a notorious claim of title,

accompanied by the essential elements of adverse
possession.

199 Va. at 976.
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Therefore,according to Virginia la1, a claim to wild lands
by adverse possession at Back Bay would not be recognized unless
evidence could be shown of some change in condition of the land.
In cases deciding the question of title acquisition by
adverse possession of land which has been used by the public
during the period of adverse possession the courts generally have
held that no title can be acquired if the public use indicates a
claim of common or public right.

56 ALR 3d 1182, 1185 (1974).

In Austin v. Minor, 107 Va. 101, 57 S.E. 609 (1907} the property
in dispute was valuable only for hunting, fishing and trapping and
to a limited extent as a range for hogs.

Apparently many

people hunted, fished and trapped upon the land.

Though the court

conceded that the claimant used the land more than anyone else,
it ruled that the requirement of exclusive adverse possession
had not been met.
Accordingly, if parcels claimed by adverse possession at Back
Bay have been used concurrently by the public as a corrunons for hunting
and fishing, the adversary claim may not be recognized in court.
Another line of cases exist that may be used to argue
against claims of adverse possession at Back Bay.

Apparently the

rule in Virginia is that any property affected with a public
interest or dedicated to a public use cannot be acquired by adverse
possession.

It was so held in Lynchburg v. C

&

O Ry. Co., 170 Va.

108, 195 S.E. 510 (1938} concerning waters of a canal owned by the
railroad; in Virginia Hot Springs Co.v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 101
S.E. 326 (1919} involving a turnpike; and in Bellenot v. City of
Richmond, 108 Va. 314, 61 S.E. 785 (1908} involving a public highway.
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Following this line of cases, any of the parcels of land at Back
Bay which were dedicated to public use as a conunons could not be
acquired by adverse possession.
The doctrine of adverse possession could also be used by the
United States in its own right.

The Back ~ay Refuge was acquired

in 1938 and hence the federal government will probably claim
that state interests in land at the Refuge have long been acquired
by the United States through adverse possession under color of title.
b)

Adverse Possession by the United States.

The second use of the doctrine could be by tne United States
in its own right.

Since the United States has held the Back Bay

National Wildlife Refuge under color of title since 1938, it could
assert title by virtue of adverse possession for the statutory
period of 15 years.
The issue will be whether the United States is allowed to
acquire title by adverse possession against a state.

The rule in

Virginia and in other states is that title by prescription or adverse
possession cannot be acquired against a state unless specifically

permitted by statute.

Seekright v. Lawson, 35 Va.

{1836); Tichanal v. Rol, 41 Va.
Lancaster, 46 Va.
52 Va.

(8 Leigh) 458

(2 Prob.) 288 {1843); Shauks v.

(5 Gratt.) 110 {1848); Levasser v. Washburn,

{11 Gratt.) 572 {1854); 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession,§ Sb;

Continental Oil Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 1.48 F. Supp. 411
{D.C. Wyo. 1957).
It does not appear that Va. Code Ann. § 41.1-8 {1981 Repl. Vol.)
as discussed supr~, would apply to the United States.

This section

gives consent to adversely possess state lands by "persons" who
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have settled continuously for five -y.ears and on which taxes have
been paid.

Neither is the United S~ates a person, or has it

••

settled or has it paid taxes on the land in question.
This rule is bolstered by the rule in Virginia and elsewhere
that any property affected with a public interest or dedicated
to a public use cannot be acquired by adverse possession.
Lynchburg v. C. &

o.

See,

Ry. Co., 170 Va. 108, 195 S.E. 510 (1938);

Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 101 S.E. 326 (1919);
Bellenot v. City of Richmond, 108 Va. 314, 61 S.E. 785 (1908).
Since part of the land at Back Bay was dedicated to public use as
a commons, if the Virginia rule is applied, there should be no
adverse posesssion.

federal courts:

This general rule is supported by several

Adverse possession does not run against public

property. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp., 389 F.2d
252 (1968).

Also, lands of a sovereign state may not be lost or

taken from it by failure to assert its title, in absence of an
agreement on the part of the state not to sue.

Even with such an

agreement, the state cannot lose such lands as it- holds for the
public trust for a public purpose.

United States v. Certain Lands

in Town of Highlands, N.Y., 52 F. Supp. 540 (D.C. N.Y. 1944).
Also a number of states have held that property held in trust
for the people cannot be lost through adverse possession.
People v. Shirokow, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30, P.2d 859 (1980); Messersmith
v. Mayor

&

Common Council of Riverdale, 223 Md. 323, 164 A.2d 523

(1960); Smith v. People, 193 N.Y.S.2d 127, 9 A.2d 205 (1959).
As demonstrated, the Virginia rule seems to be clear:

title

cannot be acquired by adverse possession against the state, and
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further, any property dedicated to a public use cannot be acquired
by adverse possession.

It might also be argued that the federal

rule on adverse possession is the same.

See cases supra.

The

problem in arguing the federal rule is that in the .cases cited
above, the United States was not the party asserting title by
adverse possession against a state.
In the one case that has been located where~ the United States
was asserting adverse possession against a state, the state rule
was not applied.

In a case before the Court of Claims, People

v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 208 (Ct. Cl. 19!;5), declared that
the

rule that no one can acquire title by adverse possession

against a state does not apply to the United States.
of Claims held that:

The Court

"The state could not ignore such occupancy.

Possession by one under the authority of the United States is a
peril against which the state must guard, just as an individual
must guard against adverse possession by anyone~."

Id. at 211.

The rationale of this case appears to be based at least in
part on a procedural limitation that is also a problem in the
present controversy.
(§

u.s.c.

The statute of limitations in 28

§ 2501

2401 applies to district courts) was held to bar actions by

the state against the United States after six years.

Thus, after

that period, the state could not even sue the federal government
much less defend title against an assertion of adverse possession.
This decision can be criticized on several grounds.
First, it effectively allows the United States to acquire title
by adverse possession after only six years, since it has not
consented to be sued after that period.
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Secondly, it appears

settled that a s"t;ate cannot acquire litle by adverse possession to
land belonging to the United States.
(1956).

Note, 8 Ala. L. Rev. 408

This Court of Claims case seems to have enunciated a

strange rule that one governmental body can, in effect, acquire
title by adverse possession against the other without the latter
having the same power.

There seems to be grounds for an

equitable argument on this point.
Also, this case can be distinguished if the statute of
limitations can be tolled in the present action.

Since the

statute barred the suit in People v. United States, supra, the
state rule was overcome.

rule will be relevant.

But in the present action, the state

See section IV, B, 6. of this report for

arguments for tolling the statute.
A key issue here as with other arguments in this report will
be whether the state rule or some federal rule should apply.

The

Court of Claims seemed to have formulated its own rule rejecting
state law in People v. California yet the Conunonwealth can argue
with authority that state law should govern in cases affecting title

to lands.

White v. Burnley, 61 U.S. 235 (1858); Beauregard v. New

Orleans, 59 U.S. 497

(1856); Heirs of Burat v. Board of Levee Com'rs.

of Orleans, 46 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1974); Mays v. Kirk, 414 F.2d
131 (5th Cir. 1969); Jewell v. Davies, 192 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1951);
and more specifically, the law of the state where the land lies
Christ Church
,.
(10th Cir. 1964) cert. den.

controls on the question of adverse possession.
Pentecostal v. Richterberg, 334 F.2d 869
379 U.S. 1000.
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VI.

ADMINISTRATIVE ALTERNATIVES/

PETITION TO AMEND BACK BAY REGULA.TIONS
Even though the chance for ultimate success is unlikely,
one possible way to avoid some of the problems associated with
litigation is to petition the Department of Interior to amend or
repeal the regulations governing entry and use of the Refuge.
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e), grants
the right to petition a federal agency for the issuance,
amendment, repeal of a rule promulgated by a fe?deral agency.
Title 43 CFR §14.6(b)

(1980) provides that any person may petition

the Secretary of Interior for the issuance, amendment, or repeal
of a rule concerning public lands.
The section provides that the petition will be addressed to
the Secretary of Interior or the U.S. Department of Interior.

It

must identify the rule requested to be repealed or provide the
text of a proposed rule or amendment and include reasons in support
of the petition.
The current regulations governing public entry and use
of the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge can bE~ found in 45 Fed.
Reg. 35823-27 (May 28, 1980), as amended by 45 Fed. Reg. 52391-92
(Aug. 7, 1980).

The current regulations allow only those

individuals who were permanent residents of the Outer Banks area
as of December 31, 1979, to qualify for commutE~r permits across
the Refuge.
The state will ultimately need to formulate the text of a
proposed rule or amendment to the special regulation now effective
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for Back Bay.

~his section will attempt to provide the background
,.

to the regulations currently in effect and to suggest several
possible reasons in support of a petition to repeal or amend
the Back Bay regulations.
The current rule governing access and use of the Back Bay
Refuge was published in the Federal Register May 28, 1980.

A

series of special regulations governing public access of the
Refuge have been promulgated beginning January 12, 1972, when
notice was first provided that the Refuge would be closed to
unauthorized vehicles.

The May 28 regulation provided that only

permanent, full-time residents of the Outer Banks area who could
furnish adequate proof of continuous residence, commencing prior
to December 31, 1976 could qualify for motorized vehicle permits
ac~oss the Refuge.

This rule was to be effective through

December 31, 1982.
However, on July 25, 1980, President Carter signed into law
Senate Bill 2382 (P.L. 96-315) which eased requirements for
commuter permits through the Refuge.

This law provided that any

permanent resident of the Outer Banks area who showed adequate
proof of residence prior to December 31, 1979, could qualify for
a commuter permit through the Refuge.

Consequently, this piece

of legislative rulemaking was published in the Federal Register
on August 7, 1980, as an amendment to the May 28, 1980 special
regulation.
Apparently, this Congressional action was initiated by Senator
Jesse Helms of North Carolina.

According to the U.S. Fish and

Wildlife Service, Division of Refuge Management, Senator Helms
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petitioned the Service to amend the May 28 regulation at the
request of Outer Banks constituents.

When the Service refused,

Senator Helms attached the amendment as a rider to Senate Bill
2382 and obtained Congressional approval.

This amenciment increased

the number o'f permit holders from approximately 23 to 39.
It may be advantageous for the state to explore a similar
congressional course of action to achieve access through the
Refuge.
Any petition for amendment to the Back Bay rules must be
amended so as to comply with statutory and regulatory provisions.
The National Wildlife Refuge System, 50 CFR

§

:26 (1980) provides

that public access, use and recreation is permitted in the National
Wildlife Refuge System.

Congressional authorization is codified

in 16 U.S.C. § 668dd{d).
In addition, the Refuge Recreation Act of 1962, 16 U.S.C. 460k,
authorizes the Secretary of Interior to administer National
Wildlife Refuges for public recreation as an appropriate
incidental or secondary use only-to the extent that i t is
practicable and not inconsistent with the primary objective for
which the area was ·established.

The National Wildlife System,

50 CFR § 25.ll{b) provides that:
All national wildlife refuges are maintained for
the primary purpose of developing a national program
of wildlife and ecological conservation and
rehabilitation.
These refuges are established for
the restoration, preservation, development and
management of wildlife and wildlands habitat; for
the protection and preservation of •~ndangered or
threatened species and their habitat; and for the
management of wildlife and wildlands to obtain the
maximum benefits from these resourct:S.
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In addition to the requirement ::t;.hat any recreational use
;.·

·'

...

will not interfere with the primary _purpose for which the area
was established, the Refuge Recreation Act also requires that
funds be·available for the development, operation and maintenance
of the permitted forms of recreation.
Therefore, the petition to amend the Back Bay regulations
must include supporting evidence that the use to be authorized by
the proposed regulations will be in compliance with this Act.
Further evidence to support the proposed regulation can be
based on the fact that vehicular traffic is permitted in many other
national refuges throughout the country.

While each refuge is

certainly unique, the assessment criteria for all refuges should
be uniform.

The May 28, 1980 special regulation for Back Bay states

that the final determination on public access in Back Bay was
based on consideration of among other things, Environmental Impact
Statement 72-33 of December 29, 1972, Environmental Impact
Assessment of May 4, 1976, and the Fish and Wildlife Service's
Final Environmental Statement on the operation of the National
Wildlife Refuge System published November 1976.
While the environmental impact of vehicular traffic
certainly varies from refuge to refuge, a number of special
regulations were promulgated (or at least reviewed and updated)
within the past year that permitted public access by motor vehicles
into national refuges.

Special regulations pursuant to 50 CFR

Part 26 were published January 5, 1981, at 46 Fed. Reg. 913-917
(1981) permitting motor vehicles into refuges in Rhode Island,
Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, New York, New Jersey and
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Pennsylvania.

Vehicular traffic is also permitted in refuges in

Wisconsin, 45 Fed. Reg. 85030 (1980), Oklahoma and Texas, 46
Fed. Reg. 8525 (1981).

However, it is difficult to ascertain

precisely how limited this public access is judging solely from
the rules published in the Federal Register.

Vehicular traffic

may be much more limited in practicality than it appears to be in
the Federal Register.
It may be especially significant to note that motor vehicles
are permitted in Chincoteague National Wildlife Refuge at
Chincoteague, Virginia.

Vehicular traffic has been allowed there

for some time; the current regulation now in effect can be found
at 45 Fed. Reg. 22047 (1980).

In part, these regulations

provide that:
Operation of registered motor vehicles and
bicycles is permitted on designated access reads,
trails, and parking areas . . . . Off-road
travel by oversand vehicles is permitted only
on designated routes within the public use
areas. .
Motorcycles and mopeds must
remain on designated access roads and are not
permitted in oversand vehicle areas . . . •
Forty-two (42) oversand vehicles are~ permitted
in the oversand zone . . . .
Since there is such a wide disparity in policy concerning
public access and use of these two national wildlife refuges
in Virginia, it may be valuable to investigate the rationale.
The question might be raised:

Does the environmental impact of

vehicular traffic at each refuge differ enough to justify such
disparities in the regulations?
It must be recognized that past attitudes of the Department of
Interior indicate that the petition will have little chance of
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success.

However, it should be nq:1;.ed that the Administrative

Procedure Act,

·s

the decision.

Section 702 provides that a person suffering legal

U.S.C.

§

702, prdtides for a court review of

wrong because of agency action, or adversely effected by agency
action is entitled to judicial review.

Thus, not only may the

state force the Department of Interior to take an official
stance on the issue of access through the Refuge, but may obtain
review of any denial of the petition.
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Evidence of the coast in the Back Bay area being a commons or
fishery spans a period of approximately 300 years.

Only during

a brief period after the War Between the States from 1866-1873
could commons have been conveyed by state grant.

A survey filed

for public record in the Princess Anne Courthouse in the late
1860's depicts a commons 907 feet above the high water mark
spanning the eastern part of what is now the Back Bay National
Wildlife Refuge.
commons.

There is no record of the state conveying this

In 1873 the state enacted legislation banning state grant

of seashores except by special act or compact.

The southern portion

of the Refuge was conveyed by regular state granting procedures after
that date.

This grant could not have legally included the seashore

of what is now the Refuge.

In 1888 the state enacted similar

legislation protecting marshes.

This statute may have barred

a 1905 grant of a marsh island in what is now the Refuge.
In 1929 the federal Migratory Bird Conservation Act was passed
and provided for the establishment of federal refuges subject to
each state granting consent by law to the federal acquisition of
land within a state.

In 1930 Virginia by_ statute "assented" to the

provisions of the federal Migratory Bird Conservation Act "as far
as it necessary."

In 1936 two years prior to the condemnation

of the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge the state repealed an
earlier law providing for federal condemnation of private,
corporate, and state land. The Statute

enacted as a replacement,

consented only to the federal condemnation of private and corporate
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land for natural resource purposes.
In 1937 the federal government,after entering into a
purchase agreement with the Princess Anne Club,became aware of
title problems within the proposed Refuge and decided to condemn
rather than purchase.

A title examination conducted for the federal

government showed an area of 1,046 acres to have questionable title.
The state was the logical claimant to this land.

Language in the

chain of title of lands now within the Refuge speaks of commons
and public lands.

Of public record was·the 1869 survey depicting

commons within the proposed Refuge.
A: m:ap_ ~:s · prepared by the federal government for use in the condemnation
suit which failed to reflect the 1869 conunons survey or seashores and
marshes not subject to private ownership.

The map also incorrectly

superimposed much smaller grants of 82 acres and 195 acres to private
parties over this 1,046 acre area subject to state claim.

This gives

the appearance that the proposed Refuge is entirely in private or
corporate hands and therefore subject to condemnation under the 1936
Virginia statute permitting only private and corporate condemnations.
In 1938 the federal condemnation was accomplished and the state enacted
a statute in that year ceding wildlife jurisdiction within the
Refuge to the federal government and specifically made the grant of
state jurisdiction associated with the Refuge subject to the 1936
Virginia statute permitting federal condemnation of only private and
corporate land.
The Commonwealth of Virginia has arguable claims against the
federal government regarding lands within the Back Bay National
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Wildlife Refuge.

At the time of the condemnation of the Back

Bay National Wildlife Refuge the state appears to have held title to
a large portion of the barrier beach now comprising the eastern
part of the Refuge.

The state may have also held title to a

small marsh island in what is now the western p.art of the Refuge.
Had the state consented to the condemnation of state land for the
establishment of a Refuge as required under the federal Migratory
Bird Conservation Act of 1929, and had the federal government,
in a reasonable analysis of the title information, notified the
state as a potential claimant in the condemnation proceedings, then
possibly only the landward portion of the 1,046 acre tract would have
been lawfully conveyed without a special act or compact from the
General Assembly specifically providing for conveyance of
seashores ungranted as of 1873 and marshes granted as of 1888.
The state, however, never consented either generally or specifically
to the condemnation of state lands under the federal Migratory
Bird Conservation Act of 1929 thereby rendering the condemnation
invalid as to state lands within the Refuge.
If adequate state consent could be found the question of notice
must be raised.

A reasonable analysis of the title information would

raise questions of state claims.

It is a well supported principle that

potential claimants in condemnation proceedings are entitled to the
right of notice under principles of due process.

It would seem that a

potential claimant, particularly the state considering the special
nature of these lands, should receive the required notice.

Yet,

Virginia was not accorded that right and was either negligently
or deliberately misled as to its potential claims.
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Although the defenses that could1ionfront
the state in
~;r:~·.·O::::.·.:,,-

seeking redress --:res judicata, varf"6us types of estoppel,
!aches and the statute of limitations -- appear surmountable,
tolling the statute of limitations under federal statutes waiving
sovereign immunity and permitting state claims warrant comment due
to the special nature and history of the lands in question.
The statute of limitations may be tolled if it is not reasonable
to expect Virginia to have been aware of a claim to such lands.
It is unreasonable to expect the state to have been aware of its
claims within the Refuge in 1938 given the history and nature
of these lands.

Virginia suffers many of the same problems

regarding commons and the loss of such lands as did Great Britain.
Such lands are particularly subject to usurpation by private parties
by being uninventoried, owned in common, important only locally, and
generally misunderstood by those using them as to concept and
associated legal rights.

State claims to lands within the Back Bay

National Wildlife Refuge were concealed from the state not only
through a history of private usurpation but also by a relatively
recent federal obfuscation.
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APPENDIX 1

The Evolution of Claims to Title
To Lands Within the
Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge

Figures 1 through 9
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Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge,
Virginia Beach, Virginia.
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Figure 2:

Conunon Lands Evidenced By an 1869 Survey
Recorded in the Princess Anne County Courthouse
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Long Island Tract Before 1876
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Figure 4:

Long Island Tract After 1876
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Figure 5:

AUGUST 26, 1885

Lands on the Shore of the Refuge Conveyed After
the Statute of 1873 Prohibiting State Grants of
the Shores of the Sea
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Figure 6:

Marsh Lands Conveyed After the Statute of 1888
Prohibiting the Grant of Marsh and Meadowlands
on the eastern shore of Virginia
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Figure 7:

MAY 8, 1880

Key Tract Placement According to a 1937 Map
Prepared and Used By the Federal Government
in the Condemnation Suit
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Figure 8:

MAY 8, 1880

Key Tract Placement Determined by Project Research
According to Information in the Possession of the
Federal Government Prior to the Condemnation
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All Lands Subject to Potential State Claims
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APPENDIX 2
POSSIBLE REFERENCES TO COMMON RIGHTS
SUPERIMPOSED OVER PRIVATE RIGHTS
1.

Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 1, page 514, 1708,
Edward Lamount to Lewis Conner, 1,775 acres [th~ entire
Refuge beach] " . • • with all commons and common of pasture
whatsoever • . . . "

2.

Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 2, page 13, 1708,
Thomas Griffin to J. Johnson, lying on the seaside in
Princess Anne County . • . all "woods, rivers, profitts,
11
commons of pasture, hereditaments. .

3.

Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 5, page 112, 1736,
Lewis Conner to George Smyth, "all that tract of land, sand
bank and marshes containing 200 acres . . . and bounding
on the sea and bay . • . To have and to hold . . . together
with all and singular ye commons pastures woods underwoods
wayes waters water courses easements profits . . • . "
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APPENDIX 3
POSSIBLE REFERENCES TO PUBLIC OR COMMON LANDS
IN THE BACK BAY AREA
1.

Records of the Virginia Company, April 1621, House of Commons,
"Act for the Freer Liberty of Fishing" set forths the public's
right to freely use the sea shore in the Colony of Virginia
for the purposes of taking, drying, salting and otherwise
processing fish, gathering of wood for fuel and repairs, and
for the purposes of performing any other activities necessary
for the maintenance of their fishery operations.

2.

Records of the Virginia Company, June 1621, Letter from the
Privy Council, "the people of the Colonies . . . should have
freedom of the shore for drying of their nets, and taking
and . saving ofII their fish and to have wood for their necessary
uses . . . .

3.

Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 3, page 401-402, 1721,
Lewis Conner to Reodolphus Malbone, "on the sand banks near
the table of pines on the eastern shore . . . 250 acres . . •
and running from ye said wading east a direct course to ye sand
banks [sand dunes] of ye sea-shore and from thence along ye
sea shore . . . . "

4.

Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 5, page 38, 1735,
Lewis Conner to John Gornto, one piece of sand banks and marsh
containing 100 acres" . . . bounding on ye said Back Bay and
sea shore . . . . "

5.

Acts of Assembly, Chapter II, May 1780, "An Act to secure to
the publick certain lands heretofore held as common."
"Whereas, certain unappropriated lands on the bay, sea, and
river shores, in th~ eastern parts of this commonwealth, have
been heretofore reserved as a common to all the citizens
thereof, . . . • Be it therefore enacted by the General Assembly,
all unappropriated lands on the bay of Chesapeake, on the sea
shore, or on the shores of any river or creek in the eastern parts
of this commonwealth, which have remained ungranted by the former
government, and which have been used as a common to all the good
people thereof, shall be, and the same are hereby excepted [from
grant] . "

6.

Clerk's Office Virginia Beach, Deed Book 22, page 154, 1790,
John Gornto to Robert Trower, 50 acres of "marsh land, sand
banks and flat lands . . . bounding on the said back bay and
sea shore . . . . "
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7.

Letter from R. E. Nash to Board of Public Works, 7/5/1870,
"I have been authorized to purchase a small strip of sand land
which I surveyed • . •
"
{Sand Bridge to North Carolina].

8.

Letter from R. E. Nash to Board of Public Works, 7/9/1870,
" . . • strip of sand land
"

9.

Letter R. E. Nash to Board of Public ¥,rks, 7/28/1870,
"I want to purchase for the Hon. Ben. Wood • • . a barren
strip of sand land from sand Bridge to the N. Carolina line

10.

Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 53, page 191, 1877,
Governor of Virginia to Hartley, 50 acres of marshland known
as Pasture Marsh bounded on the North, East and South by the
Atlantic Beach and on the West by the waters of Back Bay.

11.

Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 53, page 395, 1878,
Governor of Virginia to Jacob Travis [North of the Refuge],
bounded on the North by Forked Creek, on the East by said
Creek and the Atlantic Beach.

12.

Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 57, page
Governor of Virginia to Ellenton Newbern [South of
" . . . joining James Ewell on the North, the said
East other Public land on the South and the Waters
on the West. •
"

13.

Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 56, page 197, 1883,
George Dawley to James Knowlton, bounded on the east" • . .
by the sand land lying between the above-named tract of land
and the Atlantic Ocean."

14.

Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 56, page 472, 1883
Governor of Virginia to Burwell Ewell, [just south of
Barbour tract], " . • • This land is bounded as follows: On
the North by the lands of Otis Ewell, on the east by other
public land . . . and on the west by the waters of Back Bay.

482, 1882,
the Refuge],
Beach on the
of Back Bay

15.

Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 57, page 297, 1884,
James A. Knowlton to Tenney and Woodbury, bounded on the
east" . • • by the sand land lying between the above named
tract of land and the Atlantic Ocean."

16.

Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 69, page 327, 1900,
Levi Woodbury et ux. to William Barbour [refers to "Dawley"
tract], boundecr-o~the east" . • • by the sand land lying
between the above named tract of land and the Atlantic Ocean."

127

"

"

APPENDIX 4·
Chapter II, Acts of Assembly, 1780

An act to secure to the publick certain lands heretofore
held as conunon.
1. WHEREAS certain unappropriated lands on the bay, sea,
and river shores, in the eastern parts of this commonwealth, have
been heretofore reserved as common to all the citizens thereof,
and whereas by the act of general assembly entitled "An act for
establishing a land office, and ascertaining the terms and manner
of granting waste and unappropriated lands," no reservation
thereof is made, but the same is now subject to be entered for and
appropriated by any person or persons; whereby the benefits
formerly derived to the publick therefrom, will be monopolized
by a few individuals, and the poor laid under contribution for
exercising the accustomed privilege of fishing:
Be it therefore
enacted by the General Assembly, That all unappropriated lands
on the bay of Chesapeake, on the sea shore, or on the shores
of any river or creek in the eastern parts of this commonwealth,
which have remained ungranted by the former government, and
which have been used as common to all the good people thereof,
shall be, and the same are hereby excepted out of the said recited
act, and no grant issued by the register of the land office for
the same, either in consequence of any survey already made, or
which may hereafter be made, shall be valid or effectual in law,
to pass any estate or interest therein.
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APPENDIX 5
Chapter 333, Acts of Assembly, 1873

Chap. 333 - An Act for the Preservation of Oysters and to
Obtain Revenue for the Privilege of taking them Within the Waters
of the Commonwealth.
1. All the beds of the bays, rivers and creeks, and the shores
of the sea within the jurisdiction of this commonwealth, and not
conveyed by special grant or compact according to law, shall
continue and remain the property of the commonwealth of Virginia,
and may be used as a common by all the people of the state for
the purpose of fishing and fowling, and of taking and catching
oysters and other shellfish, subject to the reservations and
restrictions hereinafter imposed.
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APPENDIX 6··
Chapter 219, Acts of Assembly, 1888

Chapter 219 -- An Act to prevent the granting of unappropriated
marsh or meadow lands on the eastern shore of Virginia.
1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of Virginia, That all
unappropriated marsh or meadow lands lying on the eastern shore
of Virginia, which have remained ungranted, and which have been
used as a common by the people of this state, shall continue as
such common, shall remain ungranted, and no land warrant located
upon the same. That any of the people of this state may fish,
fowl, or hunt on any such marsh or meadow lands.
2.

This act shall be in force from its passage.
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APPENDIX 7
Chapters 101 and 62, Virginia Code, 1873

State property in oysters and in beds of water courses.
1. All the beds of the bays, rivers aud creeks, and the
shores of the sea within the jurisdiction of this commonwealth,
and not conveyed by special grant or compact according to law,
shall continue and remain the property of the commonwealth of
Virginia, and may be used as a common by all the people of the
sta~e, for the purpose of fishing and fowling, and of taking
and catching oysters and other shell-fish, subject to the
reservations and restrictions hereinafter imposed.
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APPENDIX 8
~·-.:. ':

Chapter .272, Acts of Assembly, 1930

Chapter 272 -- An Act relating to the acceptance by the
Commonwealth of Virginia of the provisions of the United States
migratory bird conservation act.
Whereas, the congress of the United States has passed an
act entitled and commonly known as the "migratory bird conservation
act".; and
Whereas, i t is provided in section seven of the act aforesaid that
no conveyance of land as a bird sanctuary shall be accepted by the
secretary of agriculture unless the State in which the area lies
shall have consented by law to the acquisition by the United States
of lands in that State; therefore,
1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of Virginia, That
the assent of the general assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia
be and is hereby given to the provisions and requirements of the
said migratory bird conservation act in so far as it necessary
for the purposes of such conveyance, acceptance and acquisition
herein referred to, and the commission of game and inland fisheries
of the Commonwealth of Virginia is hereby authorized, empowered
and directed to do all things necessary to bring about the
establishment of a bird sanctuary under the provisions of said act
in the Commonwealth of Virginia, and to cooperate to the fullest
extent with the United States migratory bird conservation commission.
2.
An emergency existing, this act shall take effect and be in
force from its passage.
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APPENDIX 9
Consent Legislation of States Other Than Virginia

North Carolina
§104-10. Migratory bird sanctuaries or other wildlife refuges.
The United States is authorized to acquire by ·purchase, or by
condemnation with adequate compensation, such lands in North
Carolina as in the opinion of the federal government may be
needed for the establishment of one or more mi9ratory bird
sanctuaries or other wildlife refuges . . . .

Utah
23-21-6. Acquisition of lands by United States for migratory
bird refuges. -- (1)
The consent of the State of Utah is given
to acquisition by the United States of such areas of land or water in
the state, as the United States may deem necessary, by and with the
consent of the county commission of the county where the land or
water are located and after approval of application, subject to the
laws of the State of Utah for water rights, for the establishment
and maintenance of migratory waterfowl refuges in accordance with
and for the purpose of the Act of Congress approved February 18,
1929, entitled "Migratory Bird Conservation Act" . . . .

Illinois
§ 34.
Consent for acquisition of land -- Service of process.
Consent of the State of Illinois is given to the United States for
the acquisition by purchase, gift or lease, of such areas of land
or water, or of land and water in Illinois, as the United States
may deem necessary for the establishment of preserves or reservations
for migratory birds, in accordance with the Act of Congress approved
February 18, 1929 • . . .

Washington
37.08.230 Migratory bird preserves. Consent of .the state of
Washington is given to the acquisition by the United States by
purchase, gift, devise, or lease of such areas of land or water, or
of land and water, in the state of Washington, as the United States
may deem necessary for the establishment of migratory-bird
reservations in accordance with the act of congress approved February
18, 1929 . . . .
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APPENDIX 10
Chapter 382, Acts of Assembly, 1936

Chap. 382 -- An Act to amend and re-enact Sections 18 and 19
of the Code of Virginia, relating to the acquisition of lands by
the United States of America, so as to prescribe the rights,
powers and jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Virginia and the United
States of America over and with respect to such lands, and persons
and property thereon, and transactions, matters and things arising
thereon, and to amend the Code of Virginia, by adding thereto two
new sections numbered 19-a and 19-b, giving the conditional consent
of the Commonwealth of Virginia, to the acquisition by the United
States of America of certain lands in Virginia, and prescribing the
limitations imposed upon and the reservations incident to any
transfer of such lands; and prescribing the respective jurisdictions
of the Commonwealth of Virginia and of the United States of America
over such lands, over persons and property thereon, and over any
transactions, matters and things arising thereon; and to repeal
certain acts pertaining to the same subject.
Approved March 28, 1936
1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia, That
sections eighteen and nineteen of the Code of Virginia be amended
and re-enacted, and that the Code of Virginia be amended by adding
thereto two new sections numbered nineteen-a and nineteen-b, so
that the said amended and the said new sections shall read as
follows: . . .
Section 19-a. The conditional consent of the Commonwealth of
Virginia is hereby given to the acquisition by the United States, or
under its authority, by purchase or lease, or in cases where it is
appropriate that the United States exercise the power of eminent
domain, then by condemnation, of any lands in Virginia from a!!Y_
individual, firm, association or private corporation, for soldiers'
homes, for the conservation of the forests or natural resources, for
the retirement from cultivation and utilization for other appropriate
use of sub-marginal agricultural lands, for the improvement of
rivers and harbors in or adjacent to the navigable waters of the
United States, for public parks and for any other proper purpose of
the government of the United States not embraced in section nineteen
hereof.
4. An emergency existing, in that lands in Virginia are
constantly being acquired by the United States, this act will be in
force from its passage.
(Emphasis added).
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APPENDIX 11
Chapter 388, Acts of Assembly, 1938

Chap. 388 -- An Act to release and transfer to the United Stat~s
all rights and authority of the Conunonwealth of Virginia, concerning
wild life, except fish and oysters, within a certain area of 8,950
acres, more or less, in the county of Princess Anne, subject to
certain limitations and reservations.
Approved March 31, 1938
Whereas, the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States of
America, by virtue of the authority vested in him by an-act of
Congress approved February eighteenth, nineteen hundred and twentynine (45 Stat. 1222), as amended by an act of Congress approved
June fifteenth, nineteen hundred and thirty-five (49 Stat. 378),
is authorized to acquire areas of land and wate1~ for use as
sanctuaries for migratory birds and other wild life; and
Whereas, the Secretary of Agriculture has sE~lected, by and with
the consent of the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission of the
United States of America, for the establishment of a bird refuge
and wild life sanctuary, certain land in Back Bay, Princess Anne
County, Virginia; and,
Whereas, the Conunission of Game and Inland Pisheries of the
Commonwealth of Virginia has recommended that Virginia release and
transfer to the United States all her rights concerning wild life,
except fish and oysters, within said area, and certain waters
abutting thereon and adjacent thereto, in order that the same may
be developed as a migratory waterfowl refuge and wild life sanctuary
under absolute Federal supervision and control; Now, Therefore,
1.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia as follows:

Section 1. All rights and authority which the Commonwealth of
Virginia may have or possess, concerning wild life, except fish and
oysters, in that certain area of approximately eight thousand, nine
hundred and fifty acres, more or less, of land and water in Back Bay,
in the county of Princess Anne, are hereby released and transferred
to the United States of America, which area will be set aside and
established as a migratory refuge and wild life sanctuary by the
President of the United States, and which is more particularly
described as follows: • • •
·
Section 2. The jurisdiction ceded by this act shall be controlled
and measured by the provisions of section nineteen-a of the Code of
Virginia, as enacted into law by chapter three hundred and ei~hty-two
of the Acts of the General Assembly of nineteen hundred and t irty-six,
and shall not vest until the United States shall have acquired the
title of record to the said lands within the above description, by
purchase, condemnation, lease, or otherwise, and said area established
as a migratory bird refuge by presidential proclamation. Nothing in
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this act contained shall be construed as in any wise affecting the
right of navigation in and over the.water in which said qualified
wild life rights are herein released and transferred to the United
States.
(Emphasis added).
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